

THE WAR BIN LADEN WANTED ■ HOW DO WE GET OUT?

OCTOBER 25, 2004

The American Conservative

Ethnic Electorate Myths & Realities

By Steve Sailer



PUSILLANIMOUS TAC?

This Goldwater-Reagan Republican is mystified at Pat Buchanan's pussyfooting around the issue of endorsing a candidate this time. He states what everybody knows: Junior is a good man and has a nice wife. Junior is also stubborn and says things off his shoulder that dig us deeper into an international bog. A vote for Junior is a vote for Perle, Wolfowitz, and Feith. Kerry may not offer anything to the Right except the opportunity to purge the White House of their ilk and their power. It will be worth waiting four years to come home again.

JAMES L. RYAN
Oceanside, Calif.

ANYBODY BUT...

While I would not call myself a conservative, I am a reader of *The American Conservative*. I find myself in firm agreement with positions the magazine has taken including immigration, trade, and foreign policy. With respect to the 2004 presidential race, I believe no conservative who adheres to the views you express could possibly endorse Bush.

I have no illusions that TAC will endorse Kerry, but I think conservatism would be better off if he were elected. The neocons would be discredited and a much-needed purge of these imperialists could begin. Paradoxically, a Kerry victory might be the only hope left for Buchanan conservatism, as the Bush faction's grip on the Republican Party would be brought into question. At the same time, a Kerry victory would also awake and unite the conservative base; they would finally have to question what it really means to be conservative. None of Kerry's more liberal positions would ever pass in the House, and I think he would be less likely to wage an imperial war because that would anger his anti-war base. As with Clinton, it's possible that at least fiscal sanity could be restored under Kerry as it's likely to be

the only area in which a hostile Congress would co-operate and hence his only domestic achievement.

That said, I find it highly unlikely that Senator Kerry will obtain your magazine's endorsement. The only realistic options left are either to endorse no one or one of the third-party candidates. But please do not endorse the true enemy of conservatism, George W. Bush.

DAVE SEVING
via e-mail

PRINCIPLE OVER PARTY

Judging from the opening page of the latest issue of TAC, it seems you have received no small amount of abuse. A common accusation is that you've betrayed American conservatives by jeopardizing Bush's chances for re-election. I must disagree and offer you my applause. If Bush is the only conservative candidate, then conservatives have already lost. Will we now cast our votes for a tax-cut-and-spend imperialist? In choosing the lesser of two evils, one only succeeds in ensuring the survival of evil. What is the state of our democracy when a man has only two choices, and those forced upon him? What is the state of our Republic when principle no longer guides our decisions, but party?

JOSHUA MCKAY POWELL
Berea, Ky.

THE MUSLIM MIND

In a recent column, Mr. Buchanan asked, "Why does Bush continue to heed men whose policies have radicalized the Middle East and converted much of the Islamic world into a giant recruiting station for Osama bin Laden?"

I think this is a gross oversimplification of the entire Mideast problem. Mr. Buchanan tends to see the Islamic world through the prism of very Western political viewpoints: i.e., neocon policies in the Mideast turn them away from us and different policies will not. I have been

involved in Asian Studies for nearly 30 years, and I simply cannot agree with conclusions such as this—that wonks are responsible for world events and attitudes.

For Islam, the problem is quite deep: they have to reconcile why the West achieved such technological superiority over the Islamic world when Islam, in their view, is the superior system. It is not the West Bank policy (Kerry will follow probably the same type of policies with regard to Israel) that will provoke someone to kill himself and others, it is this deeper psychological discomfort that provides a motivating force.

In Islam, it is well established that non-Muslims are to be, at best, tolerated until they become Muslims. The world is divided, in their view, between Muslim and non-Muslims. Our Christian notions and their secular counterparts of equality, freedom, liberty, and democracy do not translate.

You all need to move away from analysis based on policy issues and look more closely at the belief system that is present in Islam. I'm not saying the neocons are right—probably not—but I'm not sure that even a completely federalist position would do the trick. In the globalized world, it will be very hard not to rub shoulders with others, and I don't think the Muslim Mideast will ever really feel comfortable with the West because we are, at least for the time being, non-Muslims.

DAVID NELSON
Philadelphia, Pa.

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LIES & THE LYING LIAR

It can be hard to read the work of *National Review's* David Frum, now neoconservatism's most prominent wordsmith, without calling to mind Mary McCarthy's famous remark about Lillian Hellman: "Every word she writes is a lie—including 'and' and 'the.'" Of course the lies can be artfully constructed, based on slippery association or decontextualized quotations, to give falsehood the sheen of truth. But not always. Frum has a frothing-at-the-mouth animus against antiwar conservatives in general and Pat Buchanan in particular, and though he has nurtured this hatred for some 15 years it is now especially rabid because the Iraq War he fought so hard for (not in, needless to say) is going poorly. For Frum, the idea that conservatives who were more prudent than he about invading Iraq might gain in influence is more terrible even than the prospect of an independent Palestinian state.

So in a recent column on *National Review's* website, Frum sought once again to savage Buchanan. He charged that Buchanan's argument in his best-selling book *How the Right Went Wrong*—that war against al-Qaeda and the sheltering Taliban was right and necessary but war against Iraq had been a wrong-headed diversion—was based on a false premise. Buchanan, claimed Frum, actually opposed the Afghan War in 2001. So Frum wrote, "let us not have any false pretenses about where Buchanan has really stood over the past three years ... he should not be allowed to deny his own past history ... I cannot find *any* contemporaneous declaration of support from him for the Afghan campaign."

Frum's claim was simply false. We wrote *National Review's* online editor pointing this out and quoting from Buchanan columns praising Bush's conduct of the Afghan War. And one friend of



this magazine easily found and sent Frum a "McLaughlin Group" transcript from Oct. 2001 in which Buchanan was exuberant about the thrashing American forces were about to give the Taliban.

Confronted with evidence that undermined his argument, Frum could not bring himself to do the Dan Rather thing and apologize for misleading his readers. Instead, he claimed that Buchanan was engaged in "strange double messaging" that consisted of saying one thing in print, another on TV. But the "double messaging" is yet another Frum fiction: Buchanan columns written at the time of the Afghan War clearly praised the president's policy, urged him to "wage war against all who abetted the slaughter" and exhorted, "Let us pay back those who did this." A month later, Buchanan wrote, "let us go in, get them, get out, and go home." When Kabul fell, he wrote of "a good day for America and a great day for Mr. Bush."

If the world worked as Frum imagined, there would be no need to invent Buchanan's "opposition" to the Afghan War in order to tar him; his straightforward dissent to the Iraq War would suffice. But unfortunately for the Frums of the world, the opposition of Buchanan and other antiwar conservatives to the invasion of Iraq is evidence not—as Frum claims—of an absence of patriotism, but proof of wisdom and foresight.

[WAR]

SYRIA IN THEIR SIGHTS

It was surprising to read the *Washington Post's* Jim Hoagland beating the drums "to squeeze Syria into ending its oppressive, decades-long control over Lebanon." One might have thought the War Party had enough on its plate with Iraq and with trying to gin up an attack on Iran. Why another front of belligerence, and why now? Then we remembered—only days before, the *New York Times* had published a front-page story on the "comeback" of Beirut, a city that became a catchword for communal violence and terrorism before being bombed by the Israelis in the early 1980s. A generation later, Beirut is back—cafes are full, women dressed fashionably, new hotels and apartment buildings going up, the old cliché about the "Paris of the Middle East" again in vogue. And then we understood: for War Party agitators, the phrase "Paris of the Middle East" must be like the red flag before the bull.

[CULTURE]

CHURCH OF THE DIVINE SELF

It seems that secular humanists are finally getting religion, or at least an updated version in which no God is required. Michael Kress, writing in *Slate*, alerts us to the newest thing under the sun: secular life ceremonies.

Until now, believers have had a leg up when it came to weddings, births, and funerals. Now secularists are getting into the act. Some of these life ceremonies simply ape their religious counterparts but leave out the preaching, prayer, and scriptural readings. Others contain "spiritual" elements, but only those personally relevant to the participants—including, according to one officiant on the life-ceremonies beat, "an ancient Celtic wedding ritual in which the couples' hands are tied together with a ceremonial ribbon or cloth" or "a commonly adopted Wiccan (neo-pagan) and Native American custom in which North, South, East, and West are summoned to bless and aid those involved in the ceremony."

The key is to draw "on participants' personal histories" as opposed to the faith of our fathers or the traditions of our civilization. And please, no God-talk. Let's keep the focus where it belongs in important life events—on ourselves, of course.

[IRAQ]

SITE PREPARATION BEGINS?

"A year from now, I'll be very surprised if there is not some grand square in Baghdad that is named after President Bush."

—Richard Perle, AEI keynote speech
Sept. 22, 2003

"At least six people were killed and 54 wounded Wednesday in a suicide car bomb attack which ripped through a busy shopping area in Baghdad."

—Agence France Presse
Sept. 22, 2004

[IMMIGRATION]

DRIVING WHILE ILLEGAL

What happens when routine law enforcement measures have a "disparate impact" on "undocumented immigrants"? The city of Oakland found one answer: simply call a moratorium on the offending

law enforcement. That's what happened to the city's program to reduce drunk driving with police checkpoints. These had the unintended consequence of ensnaring many Hispanic illegal aliens, unable to produce drivers licenses, proof of insurance, etc. When local Hispanic politicians complained loudly that this constituted harassment of those who "otherwise obey the law," the Oakland police chief suspended the checkpoints. But it's hard to be a police chief and openly claim you won't enforce the law, so after a few days the chief suspended the suspension. Oakland will, once again, apparently be able to use checkpoints try to curb drunk driving. Sad to say, it's hard to bet on the long-term survival of any American standard or rule that might inconvenience illegal aliens.

[BUDGET]

HEY THERE, BIG SPENDER

"Don't go there, W.," conservative commentator Michelle Malkin cautioned when the president began warning that John Kerry will "expand government." While Kerry does have the distinct flavor of a big-government liberal, Bush's spending record is one no principled fiscal conservative could applaud.

Bush notes that Kerry has not fully accounted for how he would pay for his laundry list of spending proposals. A fair point, but economic conservatives are also asking how Bush plans to pay for his promises. The Heritage Foundation's Brian Riedl points out, "While it's true that Kerry hasn't provided a detailed plan, neither has the president." Stephen Moore of the Club for Growth charged that Bush has not "been very forthright" about financing his plans and described his budgetary record as "abysmal." This race doesn't leave many options for conservatives concerned about the growth of government and its attendant red ink. ■

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How Do We Get Out?

“Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing,” wrote Rumsfeld a year ago. “Is our current situation such that ‘the harder we work, the behinder we get’?”

We now have metrics to work with. A year ago, Gen. John Abizaid estimated there were 5,000 enemy fighters. After capturing and killing thousands, officials now estimate there are 20,000 enemy. A year ago, there were two dozen attacks every day on coalition forces. According to Kroll Security International, the number is now 70 a day. A year ago, U.S. troops had the run of the country and the press could travel almost anywhere. Now there are “no-go” zones in the Sunni Triangle, and Sadr City is a scene of daily carnage. Outside the Kurdish north, few provinces are free of daily attacks.

With kidnappings and beheadings of humanitarian workers and foreign labor, many have fled the country. The press is now largely confined to the Green Zone, which has itself been subject to mortar and car-bomb attacks. American dead and wounded in July and August were higher than in the invasion months of March and April 2003.

Eighteen months after we occupied Germany, the nation was de-Nazified and pacified. Eighteen months after we occupied Iraq, Islamic fundamentalism is on the rise and, as Colin Powell now concedes, “We are fighting an intense insurgency [and] it’s getting worse.”

From 1963 to 1973, when we left Vietnam, Saigon was a safe city except during the three-week Tet Offensive of 1968. But Iraq’s capital is becoming almost uninhabitable for Westerners.

Spain, Honduras, the Dominican Republic, the Philippines, and New Zealand have all pulled out. Ukraine and Poland are debating troop withdrawals. Seventy percent of Brits tells pollsters they want Tony Blair to remove British forces, the second largest foreign contingent.

Support for Bush’s decision to invade was overwhelming a year ago. Today, a majority of Americans believe the cost of ridding Iraq of Saddam was too high. Kerry now says Bush made a mistake going in and, if he wins, we will be out in four years. But, Senator, how do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?

Robert Novak cites Bush insiders as saying we may have to move to a rapid exit in 2005. Even Rumsfeld is saying we need not pacify Iraq before drawing down U.S. forces. But why then are we building those permanent bases?

On the credit side, scores of thousands of Iraqi police and soldiers have been trained. While some joined the rebels or refused to fight in Fallujah in April, in Najaf many fought to administer a bloody defeat on Sheik Moqtada al-Sadr’s forces, though al-Sadr was allowed to evade capture or killing in a deal negotiated under the auspices of the Ayatollah al-Sistani.

At the root of the insurgency—the goal of every enemy fighter—is a determination to drive America out. Our presence, our use of tanks, Bradleys, gun-

ships and fighter-bombers, causing inevitable civilian casualties, is recruiting more enemy than we are killing.

That the number of enemy and incidence of attacks have multiplied fourfold in a year forces us to one conclusion: we are losing this war. For the guerrilla wins if he does not lose, and the Iraqi insurgents are not losing.

How do we win this war? How do we end it? How do we get out without leaving an Iraq that is a far graver terror threat than any Saddam Hussein ever presented?

The Bush strategy appears to be this. Build up Iraqi forces to lead the assault on enemy sanctuaries in the Sunni Triangle, backed by U.S. forces and firepower. Attack and occupy these cities before January. Hold elections that will, by linking slates of candidates, produce an assembly that will maintain the Allawi government in power. Have the United States then give a date for withdrawal of American forces and begin the pullout of troops—to separate the insurgency from Islamists and foreign fighters whose end goal is an Islamist regime. Continue to build up and train the Iraqi army to where it is so large, powerful, and well equipped it can crush any rebellion. Cede maximum autonomy to Kurds and Shi’ites. And head down the road to Kuwait.

But as the success or failure of the Bush presidency hangs on the outcome in Iraq, it is hard to believe Bush will not leave behind sufficient forces to prevent the loss of Iraq before brother Jeb runs in the primaries of 2008. Iraq is thus likely not only to be the issue in this election but the next as well. ■

[color by number]

Ethnic Electorate

Is courting minorities the best way to a majority?

By Steve Sailer

THERE ARE FEW TOPICS that political reporters are more likely to botch up than voter demographics. As an old marketing researcher, I'm often struck by how one can build a successful career at a major newspaper writing about voting blocs despite quantitative skills that wouldn't get him out of the mailroom at Procter & Gamble. The incompetence and gullibility of journalists when analyzing electoral segmentation would merely be amusing, except that politicians sometimes start to believe their own press clippings.

For example, Karl Rove's long-running media disinformation campaign about how desperately the GOP yearned for the "rapidly growing minority vote" has garnered the Bush administration much sympathetic press over the years from liberal reporters who never bothered to pull out their pocket calculators to check whether the scenario made numerical sense. When the crunch came just before the 2002 midterm election, however, Rove jettisoned minority outreach and went with a massive get-out-the-vote drive that mobilized the party's white base, helping the GOP to a solid victory.

Unfortunately, President Bush fell for his spinmeister's hype, making increased immigration a high priority as far back as the summer of 2001. Congressional Republicans were unimpressed, understanding perfectly well that trying to bol-

ster the GOP by importing more mostly Democratic immigrants made as much sense in the long run as the old joke about the business that lost money on every item it sold but made up for it in volume. The GOP solons were shooting down Bush's immigration trial balloon when 9/11 made the plan look foolish.

Still Bush, the truest of the true believers in Rove's story, could not be deterred from announcing on Jan. 7, 2004 a jaw-droppingly radical open-borders initiative that would allow any number of foreigners to move to the U.S. as long as they could obtain minimum-wage job offers. Congressional Republicans hushed it up but not before the conservative base's faith in their president's judgment had been rocked and his fundraising impaired.

One reason for the poor quality of demographic reporting is the invincible innumeracy of journalists. If reporters had good heads for numbers, they wouldn't be reporters. They could make more money working for the candidates, crunching data and spinning the results. So the credulous English majors who cover the candidates are constantly being snookered by campaign consultants who enjoy doing sixth-grade math.

For example, the linchpin of the widely repeated argument that the GOP must favor amnesty for illegal immigrants or go down in flames in Novem-

ber has been an endlessly cited quote that Bush pollster Matthew Dowd gave Thomas Edsall of the *Washington Post* in July 2001: "As a realistic goal, we have to get somewhere between ... 38 to 40 percent of the Hispanic vote"—up from 35 percent in 2000. Indeed, Rove & Co. made the argument that amnesty would be a clever election tactic so many times that when the president finally announced his plan, many newspapers reported the move as a cynical and desperate election ploy—not exactly the headlines the White House wanted.

But did Dowd's quote ever make any sense? Let's do the math. How crucial would, say, a three percentage point increase in Hispanics (from 35 to 38 percent) be for Bush? Latinos accounted for only 5.4 percent of all voters in the Census Bureau's survey of 50,000 households right after the 2000 election. What about 2004? The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials recently forecast that the Hispanic share would reach 6.1 percent this fall. What's 6.1 percent times 3.0 percent? It's a 0.183 percentage point increase for Bush. That's ... not much. In fact, that would be one out of every 546 votes cast.

In contrast, because there are more than 15 times as many non-Hispanic voters as there are Hispanic voters, if Bush's amnesty and open-borders plan cost him the vote of just one out of every

8,404 non-Hispanics, that would wipe out any net benefit from his three-point gain among Latinos. Obviously, Dowd's argument for amnesty is malarkey, but nobody in the press corps ever did the arithmetic.

Not surprisingly, journalists are even less ambitious when it comes to manipulating numbers on a computer. For example, you may have seen numerous references lately to demographic splits from the 2000 exit polls. Yet what happened to the data from the more recent, and thus more relevant, House of Representatives elections of 2002?

On election night 2002, the new aggregation software employed by the Voter News Service exit-polling system crashed. Eventually, however, 17,872 completed interviews were mailed in and handed over to the Roper Center. A team of academic experts inspected the data and pronounced it comparable in quality to other elections' exit polling. I bought the raw data from Roper last year and spent weeks fiddling with it in Microsoft Excel. I ended up being one of only three journalists I know of to make extensive use of the 2002 numbers.

The final problem with demographic reporting is that, as with anything involving race, ethnicity, sex, or religion, political correctness gets in the way of honest insight. For example, let's consider in detail how Rove played the national press for saps in the 2002 election.

For the Republicans to do better than their mediocre performance in 2000, their options were to:

- Persuade some members of traditionally Democratic blocs either to switch to the GOP or not bother to vote. For example, Reagan successfully reached out to white union men.
- Or induce more normally Republican groups to vote GOP thus raising the turnout rate. In the South, for instance, the GOP has become

dominant in recent years not by attracting some African-Americans—Bush lost the black vote in Mississippi in 2000 by the astonishing percentage of 96 to 3—but by strengthening its grip on whites. Bush won the state by taking the white vote 81 to 17.

The press typically advocates the first approach because, well, Diversity Is Good. But reporters are especially likely to feel that Republicans, rather than Democrats, are in dire need of broadening their tent because journalists so often feel, deep down, that there's something distasteful, illegitimate, even unthinkable about a party trying to get more votes from white men. In the subconscious media mind, white guys' votes don't really count.

Remember all the articles you read for a decade and a half about how the "gender gap"—the fact that women are less likely than men to vote Republican—was going to sink the GOP? Eleanor Smeal of the Feminist Majority Foundation invented the term, to broad acclaim in the press, right after the 1980 election. That Ronald Reagan had somehow overcome the horrifying gender gap and won easily was of no import. Every election thereafter brought a phalanx of articles thundering on about the imminent doom the GOP faced due to the gender gap. This logic could only have sounded plausible to reporters if they assumed that a woman's vote counted, or at least ought to count, for more than a man's vote.

In reality, the celebrated gender gap is dwarfed by the marriage gap. In 2002, 56 percent of married women voted for the GOP, similar to their husbands' 58 percent, compared to 39 percent of unmarried women and 44 percent of unmarried men. Overall, the GOP did better than normal among women in 2002, perhaps due to the White House's clever exploitation of the homeland security

issue. Eventually, even the dimmest reporter caught on to the fallacy in the gender-gap nostrum, but most journalists still haven't fully internalized the notion that a white voter's ballot counts just as much as a non-white's.

That's why far more articles over the years have advised the Republicans that they must win a higher percentage of minorities' votes rather than telling the Democrats that they need to gain a higher percentage of the white majority's votes. Yet a majority is, by definition, bigger than all the minorities put together. And another name for "democracy" is "majority rule."

This kind of irrational prejudice explains why you have probably never heard the chief demographic reason Bush lost the popular vote in 2000: he only captured 54 percent of whites, who made up 81 percent of the electorate. In contrast, his father had sailed to victory in 1988 over Michael Dukakis by garnering 59 percent of whites.

I calculated that if the younger Bush had merely won an additional three percentage points (or 57 percent) of the white vote in 2000, his margin in the Electoral College would have broadened from 271-267 to 367 to 171. But what if he had to sacrifice minority votes to do that? Remarkably, even if picking up those three percentage points had cost him every single minority vote in America, he still would have tied 269-269 and been elected president by the House of Representatives. (Because it grants even the most thinly populated states three votes, the Electoral College is biased in favor of white voters.)

Rove never explained these facts to the press, however. Instead, he spent years telling reporters that the GOP was going all-out to win more minority votes. So when Republican House candidates swept to a more impressive victory in 2002 than in 2000, many wrote up the story as Rove had primed them.

But that's not what happened. In truth, as the long-lost exit-poll data ultimately made clear, over the first two years of the Bush administration, GOP House candidates lost popularity among minorities. They won 25 percent of all nonwhite voters in 2000, but fell to 23 percent in 2002.

Viewed another way, minorities contributed merely 8 percent of all GOP votes in 2002, down from 10 percent in 2000. (Ironically, at the 2004 Republican convention minorities made up 17 percent of delegates and alternates, more than twice that 8 percent of voters.)

Minority outreach flopped, but the Republicans romped. How could this have happened?

The Republican House candidates increased their share of the white vote from 55 percent to 59 percent. And whites cast 82 percent of the ballots in the less glamorous midterms, up from 81 percent during the 2000 presidential contest. Therefore, GOP House candidates averaged a five-point margin of victory compared to a one-point margin in 2000.

All this talk about inroads among minorities turned out to be a convenient smokescreen obscuring the GOP's greater appeal to whites, who tend to be more interested than minorities in foreign-policy issues. Also, environmentalism, which drove some affluent and well-educated white voters to the Democrats during the peace and prosperity of 2000, faded in importance during the turmoil and recession of 2002.

Perhaps most importantly, the GOP vastly improved its get-out-the-vote drive in 2002. Turnout efforts are always focused upon a party's traditional supporters since no party likes paying good money to remind the other party's backers to vote. Because blacks favor the Democrats by about 10 to 1, they are the most cost-efficient group to turn out, and Democratic operatives got them to the polls in large numbers in prior elec-

tions. In 2002, however, the Democratic machine faltered, while the Republicans executed their "ground game" far better.

In 2004, Bush's open-borders proposal doesn't look like it's even going to help Bush among Hispanics, much less overall. The two most recent polls of Latinos showed that if the election is close, Bush might not beat the 35 percent he won last time. That's no surprise because Hispanic voters tend to be deeply ambivalent about illegal immigration, which hurts their wages and

BUSH'S OPEN-BORDERS PROPOSAL DOESN'T LOOK LIKE IT'S EVEN GOING TO HELP BUSH AMONG HISPANICS, MUCH LESS OVERALL.

overcrowds their schools. Even if they were enthusiastic for more of it, Republicans have always been vulnerable to being outbid on immigration, since Democrats actually benefit from it. To assuage congressional Republican complaints that increased immigration means more Democrats, the Bush 2004 plan would turn illegal and many new immigrants into helots restricted to lengthy but supposedly limited stays (yet their American-born children would still become automatic citizens).

But that bit of realpolitik conceded the rhetorical high ground to the Democrats. Sen. John F. Kerry is calling for illegal aliens to be put on "the path to citizenship," which at least sounds more patriotically inspiring than Bush's plan to keep scores of millions permanently disenfranchised. A poll by the James Irvine Foundation found that Hispanics favored the Democratic approach over the Bush scheme by 75 percent to 16 percent.

Despite all the hoopla about Hispanics as volatile swing voters (much of it pushed by Latino campaign consultants trying to make their services sound more necessary), they have been solidly but not overwhelmingly Democratic ever

since John F. Kennedy became the first Catholic president. In contrast to blacks, whose adamant antipathy toward Republicans knows no season, the GOP's popularity among Hispanics generally rises and falls in the same cycles found among whites. For example, the GOP's best election among Latinos was the so-called "angry white male's" big year of 1994, when Newt Gingrich-led Republican House candidates captured 39 percent of Hispanics. This pattern confuses journalists because they don't

look at the voting trends among whites, so they become overexcited by the ups and downs in the Latino balloting

Since 1980, the GOP has always performed between 19 and 28 percentage points worse among Hispanics than among whites. In 2002, for instance, the GOP won 38 percent of the Latino vote, up from 35 percent. Yet because the GOP's white fraction rose by four points, the gap between whites and Hispanics grew from 20 to 21 points (59-38 in 2002 compared to 55-35 in 2000). Ho-hum.

But, but ... everybody knows the Hispanic vote has grown so much that Republicans must, as Mickey Kaus jokes, "Hispander" to them on immigration, right? Didn't mass-immigration-boosting pundit Michael Barone, editor of *The Almanac of American Politics*, claim last year that the Hispanic vote "could be 9 percent in 2004...?"

Well, as historian Daniel Boorstin liked to say, in America there's often a profound confusion between facts and those things that haven't yet gone through the formality of taking place. Hispanic electoral dominance is one of the latter. According to the authoritative Census Bureau study, the Hispanic

share of the vote actually fell from 5.4 percent in 2000 to 5.3 percent in 2002. In the big picture, the Latino vote is definitely growing and will hurt the GOP in the long run, but I doubt that it will reach Barone's 9 percent until the 2020 election. Indeed, in the tradition of economist Julian Simon's celebrated wager with environmentalist Paul Ehrlich over commodity prices, I've been publicly offering since May to bet Barone \$1,000 over whose forecast of the size of Hispanic vote in 2004 will be validated by the Census Bureau, mine (6.1 percent) or his. For some reason I haven't heard back from Barone.

Sooner or later, though, formerly rock-ribbed Republican states such as Arizona and Colorado will follow California's lead into the Democratic column due to the growth of Hispanics. That's why the GOP needs to regain control of our borders now, while Republicans still hold a strong hand. If the GOP doesn't act soon, immigration will become a perpetual-motion machine for making more Democrats, just as the unstoppable Liberal Party in Canada uses immigration to create Liberal voters.

An already existing threat to Republican legislators that is almost never discussed is Latino "rotten boroughs." Non-Hispanic voters of all races are having their votes devalued by the custom of drawing districts according to the total number of residents—including even illegal aliens. This allows Hispanic Democrats to be elected with dramatically fewer votes cast in their districts. Latino Democrats accounted for perhaps merely 8 percent of the California electorate in the 2002 election. But Latino Democrats won 20 percent of the seats in the Golden State's Senate and Assembly.

As the illegal immigrant population grows, rotten boroughs are starting to have a sizable impact on Congress and thus on the distribution of electoral votes. For example, in Southern Califor-

nia's beachfront Congressional District 46 (which is only 17 percent Hispanic), 173,000 voters decided the fate of the surfing Republican Congressman Dana Rohrabacher. (He won again.) Next door in District 47 (65 percent Hispanic), in gritty northern Orange County, prominent Democratic fundraiser Loretta Sanchez triumphed despite just 68,000 votes being cast. Overall, the eight California congressional elections won by Latinos (all of them Democrats) averaged 80,000 ballots split among all the hopefuls. In the other 45 California races, a mean of 143,000 voters went to the polls. This meant that the average voter in a district that elected a Latino Democrat had a 78 percent greater say in choosing a House member than the voters in the rest of the state.

The fatalistic attitude of Republicans toward rotten boroughs is constitutionally unwarranted. The highest federal court that has ruled rule on their validity, the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, outlawed them in the upper Midwest in 1998. The distinguished jurist Richard J. Posner opined, "The dignity and very concept of citizenship are diluted if non-citizens are allowed to vote either directly or by the conferral of additional voting power on citizens believed to have a community of interest with the non-citizens."

COLORADO WILL FOLLOW CALIFORNIA INTO THE DEMOCRATIC COLUMN.

What about the Asian vote, which is three-eighths as large as the Hispanic vote? That's a prosperous immigrant group, so doesn't it vote Republican, just as Hispanics are supposed to when they eventually get affluent?

Back in 1992, Asian-Americans cast 55 percent of their votes for George H.W. Bush and 15 percent for the center-right Ross Perot. Ever since, they've been

trending steadily Democratic, giving only 34 percent of their ballots to the GOP in 2002. Nobody is sure why. Journalist Arthur Hu argues plausibly that Asians tend to be slightly more conservative than their neighbors, but they tend to have liberal white neighbors. Many young Asians attend elite colleges where campus liberalism rubs off on them.

A recent poll of Asian-Americans found Kerry leading Bush 43-36. Kerry was winning among younger voters, Hmong, Asian Indians (who will no doubt be the most politically influential of the Asian immigrant groups due to their wealth and excellent English language skills), Chinese, and Japanese. Bush was ahead among older voters, Vietnamese, Filipinos, Koreans, and Pacific Islanders.

Another immigrant group that Bush and Rove pursued ardently in 2000, with Grover Norquist's help, was Muslims. Bush promised during the campaign to ease antiterrorist enforcement, including eliminating ethnic profiling of Arab airline passengers, a policy that might have been called into question when airport screeners, encouraged by the administration not to hassle Arabs overmuch, allowed 19 hijackers on board on 9/11.

Yet Bush and Sen. Spencer Abraham, an Arab-American, both lost in Michigan, the most Muslim state, in 2000. The

2002 VNS exit poll, the first to offer "Muslim" as a religion to check off, showed that only 0.3 percent of voters claimed to be Muslim.

An order of magnitude more numerous, but still statistically small, Jewish voters cast 3.3 percent of the ballots in 2002. Just as Hispanics are growing, however, the Jewish share of the vote is slowly shrinking. On the other hand,

Jews are often said by analysts to be particularly influential per voter due to their above-average degrees of political interest, energy, eloquence, and donations. (In contrast, because of language barriers, Hispanics would appear to be below average in influence per voter, although that never makes it into print.) Bush did poorly with Jews in 2000, winning only 17 percent, perhaps because Joe Lieberman was on the Democratic ballot. The GOP House candidates' share of the Jewish vote grew from 22 percent in 2000 to 29 percent in the last election.

A mid-September poll commissioned by the American Jewish Committee showed Kerry leading Bush 69-24. So Bush is up a little over 2000, but that must still be disappointing considering all the administration has done for the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. (The Republican record among Jews is Reagan's 39 percent in 1980, when some Jews punished Jimmy Carter for the Camp David Accord.) Despite Bush's neoconservative foreign policy, a substantial number of Jews tend to be uncomfortable with fervent Christians like the president, as the enormous brouhaha over Mel Gibson's hugely popular "The Passion of the Christ" showed. Neocon pundit Charles Krauthammer, for instance, just couldn't restrain himself from insulting his many Israel-supporting allies on the Religious Right who loved the film. Krauthammer published an op-ed entitled "Gibson's Blood Libel," calling the boffo box-office hit, "a singular act of interreligious aggression" and "spectacularly vicious."

Among Christians, the denominational equivalent of the famous gender gap (the "church chasm"?) widened substantially from 2000 to 2002. The Republican slice of the House vote pie narrowed among white Catholics, from 52 to 50 percent. Among white Protestants, though, the Republican share rose from 63 to 69 percent.

According to Brandeis historian David Hackett Fischer's famous book *Albion's Seed*, WASPs are still divided into four subethnic groups that spread west across the U.S. at roughly constant latitudes: from north to south, they are New England Puritans, Pennsylvania Quakers, Appalachian backcountry Scotch-Irish, and Southern lowlanders. He expects the bellicose Scotch-Irish and the self-righteous descendants of the Puritans to be particularly at arms this year over Iraq. "The family tree of George W. Bush is as close to pure Yankee Puritan as any presidential candidate's in many decades, but Bush has mastered the idioms of the backcountry culture he grew up in down in Midland, Texas," Fischer told me. As epitomized by the Scotch-Irish warrior Andrew Jackson, Bush's adopted culture prefers to shoot first and ask questions later.

In contrast, John Kerry is Massachusetts-bred and is part Puritan. He does best in New England and its outcroppings such as Northern California. Fischer contended that the Bush administration's doctrine of pre-emptive war on Iraq was foreign to Greater New England's traditional self-image. "It's very important to New Englanders not to fire the first shot."

Another traditional aspect of liberals' self-image is their assumption that they are smarter than conservatives. Indeed, in May hundreds of liberal websites, as well as the *Economist* magazine, fell for a telling hoax: a fictitious table of state IQ scores purportedly showing Gore states vastly outsmart Bush states. In reality, state IQ scores have not been published in decades, but school achievement scores and educational levels found in exit polls indicate the two parties are highly similar intellectually, on average. This year, however, much of Bush's support comes from the two-fifths of the public who continue to tell pollsters that Saddam Hussein was directly involved in 9/11. This view isn't

necessarily illogical—many Americans seem to assume that's why the president responded to 9/11 by invading Iraq—but it is ill informed.

This presidential election will, of course, be decided in about a dozen and a half "battleground states" such as Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan. Immigrant groups tend to be concentrated in out-of-play states such as California, New York, and Texas, so neither campaign seems to be paying them all that much heed. In fact, 2004 is starting to look like 1968 or 1972 all over again, in part because most of the attention is focused on Great Lakes industrial states where the voters are either white or black, but not immigrant, and are more blue-collar and older than is common these days. Indeed, much of the campaign controversy has revolved around what the candidates did back in 1968 and 1972 during the Vietnam War, issues of intense personal interest to white men of a certain age but not to all that many others.

No matter what happens this November, in the very long run the fate of the two parties will depend on the "battle of the cradle" and on immigration policy. In 2000, Bush carried the 19 states with the highest white birthrates, so the Republican Party will remain heavily white. The fertility of white Democrats is low: of the 10 states with the lowest white birthrate, all except Florida voted for Gore. The Mexican-American birthrate, however, is quite high, so the Democratic Party, which already received 31 percent of its votes from minorities in 2002, is likely to become nonwhite dominated if immigration continues full-speed ahead.

A country headed toward permanent division between a *de facto* White Party and a Nonwhite Party would appear to have a risky future. The only practical way to forestall this fate for a generation or two of additional breathing room appears to be to crack down on illegal immigration. ■

The Catholic Conundrum

Between pro-choice Kerry and pro-war Bush, these voters are torn.

By Daniel McCarthy

THE FAITHFUL CATHOLIC confronts a dilemma this election. Come November, he can cast his ballot for a nominal Catholic who spectacularly flouts Church teaching on abortion. Or he can vote for the incumbent who signed the ban on partial-birth abortion—but who waged a war of choice in Iraq that has been roundly criticized by the Vatican and whose backing for some embryonic stem-cell research and unflinching support for the death penalty call into question his own respect for the sanctity of human life.

While conscientious Catholics grapple with the ethics of this election, the Bush and Kerry camps face complexities of another kind: untangling the demographics of the Catholic vote. As a bloc, voters in communion with Rome make quite a prize: over 20 percent of the total electorate, with especially high concentrations in such battleground states as Pennsylvania, Ohio, and New Mexico. A shift of a few hundred or a few thousand Catholic ballots in those states could decide the election.

Courting the Catholic vote, Democrats start with an advantage—but not the kind of advantage they once had. For the first time in history, one of America's major parties has Catholics for its leaders in both chambers of Congress and in the race for the White House. But Kerry, Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle, and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi all defy the Church's social teachings, and none can count on the kind of support that John F. Kennedy received in 1960, when he won 78 percent of the Catholic vote. Today, accord-

ing to a study by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 44 percent of non-Latino Catholics self-identify as Democrats, just three percent more than call themselves Republicans.

Sharp differences between the Church and the Democratic Party over abortion do not account entirely for this sea change. But those differences caused considerable embarrassment for the Kerry campaign earlier this year. In January, Archbishop Raymond Burke of St. Louis said he would deny Holy Communion to pro-abortion politicians like Kerry. This touched off a controversy among American bishops, who lined up on different sides of the question of when—if ever—to withhold Communion. The debate grew to encompass whether Catholics who vote for such politicians should also be barred from receiving the sacrament, with Archbishop Burke and Michael Sheridan, bishop of Colorado Springs, telling abortion-rights supporters to repent or forego Communion. Some Catholic conservatives, meanwhile, suggested that pro-abortion politicians should be excommunicated outright.

By summer, the battle had come to an end if not a resolution. The U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops issued a report in June announcing that bishops can set their own policies for refusing Communion. And following the advice of the Vatican's Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the bishops acknowledged that faithful Catholics can, in limited circumstances, vote for candidates who are at

variance with Church teaching on abortion, provided there are "proportionate reasons" for doing so. What such reasons might be remains a matter of dispute.

For most Catholic voters it may not matter. An August Pew study found that 72 percent of Catholics oppose denying Communion to pro-abortion politicians. Even among those who attend mass at least once a week—presumably the most orthodox segment of the flock—63 percent do not think Kerry should be refused Communion. This becomes less surprising in light of overall Catholic attitudes toward abortion: according to the Pew Forum's "American Religious Landscape and Politics, 2004" study, only 48 percent of non-Latino Catholics believe that abortion should be illegal in most or all circumstances; a narrow majority of Catholics is pro-choice. This tide has been turning, however. Twelve years ago, just 40 percent were pro-life.

The same study finds that cultural issues in general are less important to Catholic voters than economics and foreign policy. This holds true even for those the Pew study designates as "traditionalist Catholics," 39 percent of whom chose economic and welfare issues as their top political priority, versus 29 percent for foreign policy and 25 percent for cultural issues. Accordingly, the Bush campaign has not relied too heavily on the culture war to win the Catholic vote. Instead, Bush has tailored his rhetoric of compassionate conservatism to appeal especially to this bloc, and even in foreign affairs, while adopting a policy contrary to the Vatican's

wishes, Bush has taken pains to soothe Catholic sensibilities.

Enter Deal Hudson, publisher of *Crisis* and the man who has been called the architect of Bush's Catholic outreach. A Baptist convert to Catholicism, Hudson wanted to know why orthodox Catholics did not behave like similarly devout evangelicals at the ballot box. To answer that, in 1998 Hudson commissioned Steven Wagner of the polling firm QEV Analytics to undertake an in-depth study of Catholic voter demographics. The results proved of great interest to Governor Bush's nascent presidential campaign, and Hudson became an advisor to Bush—until this August, when the revelation of a decade-old sex scandal forced Hudson to resign. (He has announced his impending resignation as publisher of *Crisis* as well. Hudson declined to be interviewed for this story, citing a busy schedule.)

Wagner's research confirmed that Catholics who attend mass once a week or more are more likely than less devout Catholics to vote Republican. This by itself is unremarkable: the same holds true for other denominations. But Wagner's analysis went deeper, elaborating upon several key ideological tendencies of churchgoing Catholics: they oppose affirmative action and believe in absolute morals, they are not anti-government and not enamored of *laissez-faire* capitalism, they believe in American exceptionalism but are not necessarily pro-military, and they are concerned about the poor. From these findings, Hudson and Rove hatched a plan.

Although Bush narrowly lost the Catholic vote to Al Gore in 2000, Hudson credits "the *Crisis* model" with improving Bush's performance. In an Aug. 20 electronic newsletter to *Crisis* readers, he boasted, "Employing this strategy, Governor Bush received ten percent more of the Catholic vote in 2000 than Senator Dole had in 1996." With Bush in

the White House, Hudson became a rain-maker and gatekeeper, acting as liaison between the administration and Catholic leaders, both lay and religious. Steven Wagner also found a role with the Bush administration, serving for a time as director of the Department of Housing and Urban Development's Center for Faith-Based and Community Initiatives.

Such faith-based initiatives are central to Bush's efforts to attract Catholics. According to David Leege, emeritus professor of political science at Notre Dame and an expert on Catholic voting patterns, Catholics are especially sympathetic to partnerships between the Church and government—"All kinds of Catholics," says Leege, "both conservative and post-Vatican II Catholics." And as important as the policies themselves is the language in which Bush couches his proposals: the very term faith-based initiative, says Leege, is "a labeling choice that appeals to Catholics."

Leege's research finds Catholic voting trends to be somewhat more complicated than they may seem from Wagner's analysis. In particular, Leege notes the existence of generation and gender gaps within the Catholic vote that may be more significant indicators of partisan tilt than church attendance. Indeed, among the youngest cohort of Catholic voters, a paradox emerges: young Catholic men are more likely to vote Republican even though they are less likely to attend mass regularly than young Catholic women, who tend to be more Democratic and liberal. Overall, younger Catholics tend to be more Republican than previous generations. "Think of it as a battle between the stork and the Grim Reaper," says Leege, as the Democratic generation dies off and the rising generation of Catholics increasingly sides with the Republican Party.

A further complication arises from the Iraq War. As Deal Hudson remarked in the March 2003 issue of *Crisis*, "In a

departure from the usual trend, support [for Bush's position] is greater among inactive Catholics on this issue." And Leege has observed Catholic disaffection on this point, too: "the research I've seen is that Catholics were more troubled by the Iraq War than any of the other categories" of Christian denomination. Even in going to war with Iraq, however, the president was careful to mollify Catholic opinion. In a recent paper Leege notes, "On the decision to invade Iraq, [Bush] refused to see main-line Protestant opponents of the war but received the papal nuncio to hear of the Holy Father's opposition to conducting a war at this time. His actual decision ran contrary to the Pope's advice, but he had visibly heard him out..."

A majority of Catholics did, in fact, support the war, and the president's supporters are quick to point out that war, unlike abortion, is sometimes permissible under Catholic doctrine. Even wars of choice and non-defensive wars can be just. Of course, they can also be unjust. The Iraq War is not likely to cost Bush the Catholic vote this season, but ironically it does dampen, however marginally, the president's support among the active Catholics who are otherwise his likeliest voters within the Church.

Leege and other experts predict that Catholics this year will vote much as they did in 2000 and much like the electorate as a whole. Whichever way they break, they are unlikely to be won by either candidate in a landslide. But seismic changes in the political landscape rarely happen overnight: the trends to watch for in the Catholic vote are in the long term. Catholics may cease to exist as a significant, distinct voting bloc, or they might continue their realignment toward the GOP. A third possibility is more remote: even if Kerry should win the Catholic vote this year, it is difficult to see the Democratic Party returning to the days of John F. Kennedy any time soon. ■

[Bush's gift]

The War Bin Laden Wanted

How the U.S. played into the terrorist's plan

By Paul W. Schroeder

GEORGE W. BUSH'S re-election campaign rests on three claims, distinct but always run together: that the United States is at war against terror, that it is winning the war, and that it can ultimately achieve victory but only under his leadership.

The second and third propositions are hotly debated. Critics of Bush contend that the U.S. is losing the struggle against terror on the most important fronts and that only new leadership can bring victory, but except for a few radicals, no one denies that the struggle against international terrorism in general and groups like al-Qaeda in particular constitutes a real war. The question comes up in the campaign only when Republicans such as Vice President Cheney charge that Democrats view terrorists as mere criminals and do not recognize that the country is at war. The charge, though false—no Democratic leader would commit political suicide by even hinting this—is effective politically.

Some experts on international law and foreign policy object to calling the struggle against terrorism a war, pointing for example to the legal problem of whether under international law a state can declare war on a non-state movement and claim the rights of war, or arguing that terrorism constitutes a tactic and that no one declares war against a tactic. Both arguments indicate the sloppy thinking that pervades

the rhetoric of the War on Terror. The first point, moreover, has important practical consequences for such questions as the treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere, and for our relations with allies, other states, and the UN. Yet these kinds of arguments seem too academic to matter. The general public can hardly understand them, much less let them influence their votes.

Other reasons, however—different, more powerful, highly practical, and astonishingly overlooked—argue against conceiving of the struggle as a war and, more important still, waging it as such. The reasons and the logic behind them are somewhat complicated, but the overall conclusion is simple: by conceiving of the struggle against international terrorism as a war, loudly proclaiming it as such, and waging it as one, we have given our enemies the war they wanted and aimed to provoke but could not get unless the United States gave it to them.

This conclusion is not about semantics or language but has enormous implications. It points to fundamentally faulty thinking as one of the central reasons that America is currently losing the struggle, and it means that a change in leadership in Washington, though essential, will not by itself turn the course of events. What is required is a new, different way of thinking about the struggle

against terrorism and from that a different way of waging it.

Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda repeatedly and publicly declared war on the United States and waged frequent attacks against its property, territory (including embassies abroad), and citizens for years before the spectacular attack on 9/11. This admission would seem to destroy my case at the outset and end the discussion. If bin Laden and al-Qaeda declared war on the United States and committed unmistakable acts of war against it, then obviously the U.S. had no choice but to declare war in reply, just as it had to do so against Japan after Pearl Harbor.

No, not really. Some other obvious facts also need consideration. First, states frequently wage real, serious wars of the conventional sort against other states without declaring war or putting their countries on a war footing. In the latter 20th century, this practice became the rule rather than the exception. Korea and Vietnam are only two of many examples. Second, revolutionary and terrorist organizations and movements have for centuries declared war on the governments or societies they wished to subvert and overthrow. Yet even while fighting them ruthlessly, states rarely made formal declarations of war against such movements. Instead, they treated these groups as criminals, revolutionaries, rebels, or tools of a hostile foreign



CHRIS HIEBS

power, not as organizations against which a recognized legitimate government declares and wages war.

The reasons are obvious. A revolutionary or terrorist movement has much to gain from getting a real government to declare war upon it. This gives the movement considerable status, putting it in some sense in the same league with the government with which it is now recognized as at war. No sensible government wishes to give such quasi-legitimacy to a movement it is trying to stamp out. Consider Napoleon's treatment of the insurrection in Spain from 1808 to 1813. The insurgents had powerful claims to belligerent status and even legitimacy. They maintained a government in a small corner of Spain, represented the former legitimate Bourbon government Napoleon had overthrown, included the regular Spanish army, and were supported and recognized by a major power, Great Britain. But Napoleon always insisted they were nothing but brigands, used this designation as justification for the brutal campaign he waged

against them, and acknowledged a state of war with them only when, defeated in Spain and on other fronts, he decided to cut his losses, evacuate Spain, and make peace with them and the Bourbon regime.

Other reasons further explain why legitimate governments have not declared war on terrorist or revolutionary organizations that waged war against them—for example, the fact that when one declares war one has to operate under the prevailing laws of war, and these can be constricting for a legitimate government, as the United States is currently finding out in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Thus declaring a war on terrorism and waging it as a genuine war has to be justified as an exception to a powerful rule, not accepted as the obvious response to a terrorist attack.

Readers may find this an impractical, academic argument and respond, "So what? This is a unique situation. Our country never faced a threat just like this before. Besides, what difference does it make what you call a campaign

against terrorism if in fact you intend to wage an all-out fight to exterminate terrorist organizations with every weapon at your command? In practical terms, that is war, whatever name you use for it, and it is good for the American public, the world, and the enemy to face it."

Again, not so fast. The issue is not whether the American public after 9/11 needed squarely to face the fact that the United States had been attacked by a dangerous enemy and had to fight back. It still needs to understand this—and does. Neither is the issue whether in fighting back the U.S. had a right to use military force against that enemy anywhere (though only where) it was sensible and practical to do so. Those points are not in dispute. The relevant, practical questions instead are, first, whether it was necessary to declare war on that enemy in order to confront the attack and fight back with every useful means, including military force. As just indicated, the historical and practical answer to that question is no. Second, was a public declaration of war against

terrorism in general needed to prepare psychologically for a serious campaign against the enemy? The reaction of the American public and virtually every other government and people to the 9/11 attack and the subsequent American counterattack makes clear that for this purpose a formal declaration was unnecessary. The support in America and abroad for a powerful campaign against al-Qaeda was overwhelming.

The only question left is the one central to the argument: did the American government, by constantly and solemnly declaring the nation at war against terrorism and repeatedly summoning the rest of the world to join up or else be ranked among America's enemies actually help or hurt the campaign against the terrorist enemy?

The natural response might be, "How could the declarations of war possibly have hurt? Even if they were not strictly necessary, they served to unite the American people and gird them for possible sacrifices and losses and to rally the rest of the world behind the American effort. What harm did they supposedly do?"

ASSUME THAT THE **ENEMY'S DECISIONS** HAVE A **PURPOSIVE RATIONALITY** BEHIND THEM, THAT HE **HOPES TO ACHIEVE** BY THEM SOME **CONCRETE RESULT**.

It was never in dispute that Osama bin Laden deliberately, repeatedly, and in the most spectacular way possible provoked a war with the United States. What should that tell us? Why did he do this? What was he after?

Once again this looks like an intellectual befogging the issue and ignoring the obvious. Osama bin Laden did this because America is his enemy. He hates America and its ideals, America stands in the way of his creating the kind of world he is fanatically determined to bring about, and so he declared war on

America and tried to destroy it and kill as many Americans as possible. This interpretation is perfectly understandable and defensible from a moral and emotional standpoint. Unfortunately, it is counterproductive from the standpoint of rational analysis and policy-making.

Two vital principles in foreign-policy thinking are, first, know the enemy—this means doing one's best to enter into his thought world and decision-making processes, to think from his presuppositions and standpoint—and second, expect a hidden agenda and look for it. Assume that the enemy's decisions and actions have a purposive rationality behind them, that he hopes to achieve by them some concrete result that is rational in terms of his goals and worldview, however fanatical, irrational, or simply evil his actions may seem.

Apply these two principles to the question here. Take for granted that Osama bin Laden is an evil fanatic, totally determined to pursue his goals and wholly unscrupulous in the means he is willing to use to reach them. But assume

also that he is highly intelligent, shrewd, patient, and focused in his strategy. Supposing this and knowing that he is the leader of a relatively small, highly secret terrorist organization, strong in devotion to its cause but weak in both numbers and weapons in comparison to the resources available to any major state, much less the world's one superpower, ask yourself: why would he go out of his way to challenge that superpower with its awesome array of resources and weapons, deliberately provoking it into declaring war to the death upon him and

his organization? The enormous risks are obvious. What were the potential gains?

Any serious and unemotional consideration of this question makes it apparent that the answer "He hates America and wants to destroy it" will not do. If that were his concrete strategy and end, that would make him a fool, which he is not. Any fairly intelligent person would know that an attack like that of 9/11, or even ten such attacks, would not suffice to defeat the United States or make it give up the struggle against terrorism and accept the unhindered spread of radical revolutionary Islam in the world. Any intelligent person would instead expect the attack on the American homeland to have precisely the political, psychological, and military effects it actually had—to mobilize the government, the American public, and many of its allies around the globe for an all-out struggle against al-Qaeda and international terrorism. Anyone with intelligence would also have anticipated the huge risks to himself and his organization from the inevitable counterattack—a military campaign by an overwhelmingly superior foe against his political base and secret camps in Afghanistan, blows to his cells wherever they could be found, international police, intelligence, and financial measures against his organization on a vastly increased scale, heavy pressure on regimes that had secretly supported or tolerated his activities to crack down on them, the imprisonment or death of anyone in al-Qaeda's ranks from bottom to top—in short, all the measures that the Bush administration carried out and has trumpeted as successes in the War on Terror. Why would bin Laden knowingly risk all this for the sake of an attack, however spectacular, that he knew would not seriously damage the United States as a nation?

Two replies frequently offered need to be considered before getting to the real answer. Each, though superficially more plausible than “He did it because he’s evil,” is fundamentally no more satisfactory. The first is that bin Laden did it to demonstrate the power, bravery, skill, and fanatical resolve of his organization and thereby gain new recruits and allies. This is undoubtedly true in a sense but far too vague. As just noted, the overwhelming surface probability was that the attack would result in gravely weakening and threatening al-Qaeda. That is certainly what the Bush administration confidently promised. Why precisely did bin Laden expect, against all probabilities, that the attack would eventually expand and strengthen his organization and cause?

The second reply is that the 9/11 operation was intended as only one step in a long campaign against the United States, a kind of dress rehearsal for worse blows, perhaps with weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, biological, or chemical. Once again, this argument makes no sense. If one intends to start a long campaign to destroy the enemy, one does not begin with an action that can be expected to galvanize rather than cripple the enemy and make him more prepared to anticipate, prevent, and counter new attacks. It would be as if Japan in 1941, having decided to fight the United States and needing first of all to cripple American naval power in the Pacific, chose to attack by bombing buildings in San Francisco and Los Angeles.

The only sensible answer, once the foolish and inadequate ones are discarded, is that Osama bin Laden anticipated the American reaction and wanted it. His purpose in attacking the United States directly in its homeland was to get the American government to do what it had not done in response to his previous attacks: to declare an all-out war against him and al-Qaeda and a

worldwide War on Terror led and organized by the United States, with every other country in the world summoned to follow and support or be considered an enemy. That seems to deepen the puzzle. Why thus deliberately multiply the ranks of his enemies and organize their efforts under the leadership of a single, powerful, aroused country?

The answer, if one thinks about it free from emotion and preoccupation with oneself, is clear. Deliberately provoking the United States into open, declared war against him, his forces, radical Islamism, and worldwide terrorism was bin Laden’s way of expanding a struggle he was already waging but losing, one he could not win on account of its insoluble contradictions, into a larger war free from internal contradictions that he could hope ultimately to win. To put it in a nutshell, Osama bin Laden needed the United States as a declared enemy to enable him to win his war against his primary enemies and thus achieve his goals.

To understand this, we need once again to take bin Laden’s fanatical ideology and his hatred for the United States and the West for granted and concentrate on his situation and the purposive rationality behind his tactics. Consider his central goal—a Muslim world ruled by true Islamic law and teaching, purged of all evil, materialist, secular, infidel, and heretical influences. Of course he regards the West, especially the United States, as the source of many of the evils corrupting and oppressing Islam and would like ideally to destroy it, but the immediate obstacles to achieving his vision and the main foes to be overcome have always lain within the Muslim world itself. (There is a good parallel here with 16th-century Europe. The Ottoman Turks were the great military and religious threat to Christendom, but the most bitter quarrels and wars were between Christians of different creeds, churches, rulers, and countries.) The

obstacles he faced consisted of the divisions in sects, beliefs, and world visions within Islam; hostile governments ruling in Islamic countries, virtually all of whom regarded his kind of Islamic radicalism as a threat to their rule and were determined to repress it; and the attitude of most Muslims, loyal to their creed but unwilling to sacrifice what security and well-being they had in his kind of *jihad*. Osama bin Laden tried to overcome these obstacles and foes directly but the struggle, besides being difficult, dangerous, and largely unsuccessful, was inherently divisive and counterproductive. It meant pitting Muslim against Muslim, alienating more followers and potential recruits to the movement than it attracted, and giving free rein to the spread within Islam of infidel influences from outside while Muslims fought each other.

There was, however, one good way to overcome these obstacles—that is, to unite Muslims of divergent beliefs, sects, and visions against a single foe; to discredit, paralyze, and possibly overthrow secular Muslim governments; and to galvanize more believers into that suicidal zeal that al-Qaeda and its kindred organizations need as a baby needs its mother’s milk. That way was to make the United States, already the Great Satan in much of the Muslim world for a variety of reasons—its support of Israel against the Palestinians, its support of corrupt dictatorships and secular regimes, its encouragement of Iraq’s war against Iran and toleration of Saddam Hussein’s atrocities, its later conquest, humiliation, and ongoing punishment of the Iraqi people through sanctions, its long record of imperialism, its greed for Arab oil, its military occupation of sacred Muslim soil, its penetration of Muslim societies with its decadent culture and values—declare open war on him and his followers united in a true, heroic Islamic resistance movement.

The solution, further, was if possible to provoke the U.S. into actually attacking Muslim countries, using its awesome weapons against pitifully outmatched Muslim forces, destroying and humiliating them, killing and wounding civilians and destroying much property, occupying more Muslim land, and mirroring itself in an attempt to control what it had conquered and to impose its secular values and institutions on Arab and Muslim societies. From this would arise the chance to demonstrate that faithful Muslims under leaders and movements like bin Laden and al-Qaeda could be David to America's Goliath. If they could not immediately slay the oppressor, they could survive its onslaught, grow and spread despite it, and gradually reduce it to a helpless giant, isolated from its former friends, trapped in an interminable occupation of hostile territory and peoples, with its armed forces stretched thin and its awesome weapons unusable, while al-Qaeda and similar groups could continue to launch even bolder attacks against it or anyone still associated with it.

That, I believe, is a reasonable rendition of Osama bin Laden's hopes and strategy. It was a tremendous gamble, of course, and he could not possibly have predicted exactly how it would turn out. But it is beyond doubt that his gamble succeeded, that for more than three years after 9/11 things have generally been going his way, and that he could not have achieved this huge, improbable victory without indispensable American help. In declaring and waging a War on Terror with al-Qaeda as its initial announced focus and the United States as its self-acclaimed World Leader, America gave bin Laden precisely the war he needed and wanted.

One can anticipate at least three reactions to this conclusion (three that are printable, that is). Starting with the least important, they are:

1. This is all hindsight, Monday-morning quarterbacking.
2. Given the circumstances, there was nothing else the United States could have done.
3. Even if this is all true, it is water under the bridge, useless in deciding what to do now.

The first is easy to answer. Hindsight is a good exercise in politics, especially for the public at election time—but this is not that. Quite a few observers warned about these dangers at the time, and I was among them. In an article written just after 9/11 and published in November 2001 (“The Risks of Victory,” *The National Interest*, Winter 2001/2002) I argued, among other things, against allowing a necessary and justified military campaign in Afghanistan to draw us into leading a general War on Terror in the wider Middle East and the world. More warnings were included in my “Iraq: The Case Against Preventive War,” appearing in this journal in October 2002. Mine was only one voice in a steady, growing chorus, though one always drowned out by crowds of raucous hawks.

The second objection has a little more substance. Certainly 9/11 required strong action including military measures against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, and the natural, inevitable war psychology pervading the country had to be reckoned with. Yet as was pointed out earlier, these needs required actions like those taken initially more than words. As far as the public rhetoric and justification was concerned, nothing hindered the administration from conceiving and explaining the undertaking differently both to the American public and the world, especially the Arab-Muslim world that was Osama bin Laden's real target.

There is little point now in drafting the kind of address Bush should have

delivered to Congress and the public. But one can readily imagine an American president (though not Bush) persuasively making the two cardinal points. First, the United States intended to pursue al-Qaeda with all the weapons at its command on grounds of legitimate self-defense and, while respecting the rights of other countries, would allow no one to interfere with these actions. It would not, however, dignify al-Qaeda's atrocious crimes by calling them acts of war or give Osama bin Laden and his fellow criminals what they obviously wanted, a pretext to portray themselves as soldiers in a holy war against the United States. Instead, it would pursue them ruthlessly the way civilized nations had always pursued criminal organizations, as international outlaws and pirates, enemies of all governments and of civilization itself, and it expected other countries to co-operate in this struggle.

Second, the United States recognized that though it was the direct target of this attack and that in one sense it represented al-Qaeda's final enemy and target, it was not the country most menaced by the current threat from al-Qaeda and international terrorism generally. As bin Laden well knew, neither this attack nor possible future ones, tragic though the individual deaths and losses were, could really hurt the United States, much less deter it from its purpose of hunting down the criminals behind the atrocities. The attack instead had already had just the opposite effect. It had strengthened the country and united Americans and their friends throughout the world for a long struggle against him and his fellow terrorist criminals. America's government, institutions, and civil society were rock solid. It had no home-grown terrorist organizations to fear or ethnic and religious differences for terrorists to exploit. Its relatively small

Muslim population was well integrated and overwhelmingly loyal to the United States, thankful for its blessings and freedoms.

Many other countries in the world could not say this, especially the Arab and Muslim countries that Osama bin Laden wanted to subvert and revolutionize as he had already done in Afghanistan. These countries and governments had the most to fear from al-Qaeda and international terrorism; they and not the United States were the real targets of the 9/11 attack. Even America's European allies and friends, sound though their countries and institutions were for the most part, had more to fear directly from terrorism than the United States, given their large unassimilated Muslim populations and their proximity to the Middle East. The United States was, of course, vitally concerned with the general problem of international terrorism. It had interests around the world to protect, including those in the Middle East and other threatened regions. Nonetheless, this was not first and foremost America's problem, nor was it America's place primarily to provide the solution. The terrorists wanted to make the United States appear an imperialist Great Satan imposing its will and its solutions on others and forcing them to follow its lead. America would not fall into that trap. The U.S. had a particular right and duty to its citizens and the world to pursue al-Qaeda and exterminate it as a criminal organization. It would help, advise, support, and even where specifically desired lead others in the global struggle against terrorism. But it would not try to force others who had an even greater and more immediate stake in that struggle to do what their own self-interest ought to compel them to do, nor would it try to dictate the kinds of internal measures and reforms they needed to take to combat the common enemy.

That kind of language would have done everything language can do both to free the United States to attack al-Qaeda and to put pressure on other governments, especially in the Middle East, to confront their own problems and responsibilities and seek help if necessary from the United States, rather than hiding behind it. It also would have undercut the al-Qaeda strategy of making the United States into the main enemy, helped place responsibilities where they belonged, and galvanized genuine world support in the struggle against terrorism. What is more, it would have been entirely consistent with the campaign against terrorism the United States actually waged at the outset. That was very much an international effort, a largely proxy war directed but not mainly fought by the U.S. and focused strictly on destroying al-Qaeda's organization and governmental base—until this focus was foolishly abandoned to attack Iraq.

To heighten the irony, this kind of language would have conformed to the actual wartime policies the administration has followed. Let us be honest: the

egy possible. It would mean that the administration had so ruined America's position that nothing could now remedy it. But it is not true. This administration's policy deserves harsh condemnation for the reckless incompetence that has made the way out now much more painful and costly, but a way out still lies in recognizing that the United States needs to abandon not the struggle against international terrorism but the conception of that struggle as a war fought and led mainly by the United States, making itself the chief target of the enemy.

This is a change only a new administration could make, though obviously not during the electoral campaign, when it would be suicidal. Once in office, however, it could claim that it had found things to be even worse than it knew and could make the kind of 180-degree turn Bush executed after his election. A gradual disengagement from Iraq and re-concentration on Afghanistan and Pakistan in the pursuit of al-Qaeda, a devolution of tasks onto the UN and NATO on the grounds that even the best meant efforts of the United States are frus-

THE "WAR ON TERROR" IN AMERICA IS **BASICALLY A SHAM**, A CHARADE.

"War on Terror" in America is basically a sham, a charade. While great, even ultimate sacrifices have been demanded of relatively few, chiefly those in the armed forces, for the overwhelming majority of Americans having the country at war has meant massive tax cuts, exhortations to spend and consume, enormous deficits, politics and government spending as usual—in short, no wartime sacrifice at all. The rest of the world knows this and sees the hypocrisy, if we do not.

As for the last reply, that this argument now represents water under the bridge, useless for current or future policy, if that were true, it would constitute the most devastating indictment of the Bush strat-

trated by the fact that it is seen as the enemy by too many in the region, a willingness to admit past mistakes and agree to focus co-operatively on other problems as well—all this would become possible, though not easy, if only the current American war mentality and psyche gave way to a saner one. This still could happen—but of course not under Bush. ■

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Hide & Sheik

Why bin Laden continues to elude us

By Eric S. Margolis

They seek him here, they seek him
there,
Those Frenchies seek him
everywhere.
Is he in heaven, or is he in hell
That damned elusive
Pimpernel?

—Baroness Orczy

WHY CAN'T OSAMA BIN LADEN, the Scarlet Pimpernel of the Hindu Kush, be found? One would assume that 20,000 U.S. troops, an even larger contingent of U.S.-paid Afghan mercenaries, four divisions of Pakistan's crack army, and a host of intelligence agents backed by every sort of high-tech satellite, aircraft, drone, and surveillance device in the American arsenal could find one extremely tall man in a wasteland of barren mountains and scrub. How can it be that a man with a \$25 million reward on his turbaned head has not been betrayed in the three years the U.S. has been hunting him in either dirt-poor Afghanistan or Pakistan, where per capita incomes are \$197 and \$462 respectively?

First, because Osama bin Laden and his chief of staff, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, may not be in Pakistan or Afghanistan at all but are hidden elsewhere in a remote part the Muslim world. Or they might both be dead, with their legend sustained by disciples through bogus tape recordings.

But U.S. intelligence and most observers of Islamic militancy, including this author, believe that al-Qaeda's senior

leadership is alive and hiding somewhere in the wild no-man's-land straddling the Pakistani-Afghan border, being sheltered and guarded by friendly Pushtun tribesmen. That or in Pakistan's equally wild Baluchistan province, where many men are well over six feet tall.

The most important reason Sheik Osama—as he is known to most Muslims—has not been caught is that he is a beloved, venerated national hero to Pushtun Afghans and to nearly all Pakistanis. In fact, most of the Muslim world has come to share this view. Only the pro-Western elites who rule most Islamic nations in alliance with the U.S. do not share this adulation—unsurprisingly, since bin Laden has made it his personal *jihad* to overthrow them.

Distasteful as it is to Americans, Osama bin Laden is the only figure in the entire Muslim world who speaks with true popular authority, commands both political and religious legitimacy, and, in the view of many, is the sole defender of Islam against what is increasingly seen, rightly or wrongly, as an all-out assault by the United States.

In the U.S., bin Laden is rightly seen as a maniacal terrorist and mass murderer. But our politicians and media have utterly failed to explain the bin Laden phenomenon. No effort has been made to understand why he has become the spear-point of a growing insurrection. Nor have they explained to Americans how the Bush administration's ideological *Anschluss* with Ariel Sharon's Likud Party in Israel brings the wrath of

Islam down on America's head. It's politically safer to keep repeating Bush's inane mantra that al-Qaeda hates America because of its freedoms.

In the days after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. put a gun to Pakistan's head, threatening to declare it a terrorist state, call in vital loans, embargo all trade and spare parts, even unleash India against Pakistan if Islamabad did not declare war on the Taliban—its Afghan creation—hunt down al-Qaeda, and allow U.S. armed forces to operate from bases there.

The Taliban resisted U.S. demands for weeks; Pakistan caved in after one phone call from Washington. The new Musharraf regime, which the U.S. before 9/11 had denounced as an unwelcome military dictatorship, abandoned its Afghan protégés, fired senior generals regarded as too Islamist, opened the doors to U.S. bases, and put its intelligence agency ISI, probably the best in the Third World, under U.S. tutelage.

Musharraf found himself in an impossible position, forced to maneuver between the demands of Washington and the passions of his people. Prompted by the carrot of over \$3 billion in new U.S. aid—not counting covert bribes—and the stick of becoming a South Asian Cuba, he bowed to American requests with what to most Pakistanis seemed untoward alacrity and zeal.

Hundreds of al-Qaeda suspects were apprehended. Pakistan's noisy Islamic parties, strong supporters of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, were repressed. The

armed forces' most capable generals were purged. Pakistan's nuclear forces, the key to national defense against seven-times larger India, were placed under U.S. "observation," the first step, many believed, to the U.S. seizing Pakistan's strategic arms. ISI's three-decade-old support for Muslim independence fighters in Indian-ruled Kashmir—who were branded terrorists by the U.S. after 9/11—was officially halted even though liberation of Kashmir is the most emotive political issue to all Pakistanis.

Pakistan's military, which always regarded Afghanistan as an essential fallback position to provide military depth in a war with India, was forced to see its strategic hinterland come under control of its bitter foe, the U.S.-backed Afghan Northern Alliance. The Alliance was led by war criminals from the old Afghan Communist Party and members of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud's Panjshiri drug-dealing mafia. Massoud was a longtime collaborator with Soviet/Russian intelligence, which was grooming him to rule Afghanistan. The Alliance now runs Afghanistan behind the amiable but powerless figurehead Hamid Karzai. It is financed and armed by the U.S., Russia, Iran, and India and currently controls the lion's share of Afghans' revived and booming heroin trade, which had previously been 90 percent suppressed by the Taliban.

Just as worrying to Islamabad, the Bush administration has strongly pressed Pakistan's army to invade the no-man's-land of the Pushtun tribal belt along the Afghan border in a crash effort to find Osama bin Laden before the November elections. Capturing bin Laden would ensure Bush's re-election.

The autonomy and inviolability from military intervention of this strategic tribal region is a fundamental article of Pakistan's constitutional agreement. By forcing Pakistani Punjabi troops to attack Waziri tribesmen, the United

States is pushing Pakistan toward possible civil war. Equally dangerous, destabilizing the tribal region threatens to tear apart fragile Pakistan by awakening century-old demands for an independent state, "Pushtunistan," by the Pushtun tribes that straddle the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, known as the Durand Line.

In sum, nothing that has occurred in or around Pakistan since 9/11 has accrued to that nation's interest, save the \$3 billion plus in cash delivered to General Musharraf and some respectability for the barracks regime. No longer reviled as a nasty military dictator, Musharraf, whom this writer interviewed soon after he came to power and found curiously lackluster, is now hailed by Washington as an "important non-NATO ally," "statesman," and "hero in the war against terrorism."

But ordinary Pakistanis outside the ruling oligarchy are furious at Musharraf

Forced by the U.S. and Musharraf's regime to bow to Washington's diktat, many Pakistanis have adopted the time-honored tactic of the colonized by replying, "Yes, Sahib," and then doing their best to sabotage or delay.

ISI and the army are filled with Islamists who on at least three past occasions warned bin Laden of U.S. and Saudi attempts to assassinate him. This writer has little doubt that senior serving and retired military and ISI officers are lending succor to al-Qaeda and actively or passively sabotaging attempts to capture its leaders. These silent resisters know that one day soon Musharraf will be overthrown by other generals, and they do not intend to be branded by Pakistanis as traitors who betrayed Sheikh Osama to the hated Americans.

President-General Musharraf is playing a version of the same game. He must show Washington he is hunting al-Qaeda, closing Islamic schools and charities, and

ONLY THE **ARMY'S BAYONETS** AND A STEADY **STREAM OF U.S. DOLLARS** KEEP THE UNLOVED **MUSHARRAF IN POWER.**

for what they see as his betrayal of Afghanistan and Kashmiri Muslim freedom fighters, their basic religious duty to defend oppressed Muslims, and America's treating Pakistan like a mercenary rather than an ally.

Only the army's bayonets and a steady stream of U.S. dollars keep the unloved Musharraf in power. Two recent attempts to assassinate Musharraf were blamed on al-Qaeda but may have been mounted by members of the military or ISI.

Most Pakistanis—some polls say over 85 percent—see Osama bin Laden as the Muslim world's greatest hero since Saladin and the only leader standing up to what growing numbers of Muslims see as their religion's most ardent foe, the United States under President George W. Bush.

shutting down the Kashmiri resistance. But in reality Musharraf is doing the very minimum to placate the Americans while trying to avoid the full fury of his people.

Pakistan's use of al-Qaeda as political currency was particularly evident when it was caught selling nuclear materials to North Korea, Iran, and Libya, an operation that could not have occurred without approval at the most senior political and military levels. Pakistan bought its way out of Washington's black book by vowing to capture bin Laden before elections and, as noted, launching military incursions into the tribal territory.

In short, we once more see the U.S. forcing an antidemocratic Third World nation to implement policies that are heartily detested by almost all of its

people. We have clearly learned nothing from half a century of Mideast misadventures. The U.S. induced Egypt's Anwar Sadat, through mammoth bribes, to make an ersatz peace with Israel that was hated by his people. And Iran's 1979 revolution was sparked by national rage against the Shah's intimate alliance with the U.S. and Israel.

Almost all of the Muslim world's current autocratic rulers are forced by U.S. pressure to comply with Washington's strategic and economic policy that often flies in the faces of their people's wishes. That is why there will be no real democratic elections in any part of the U.S.-dominated Muslim world and why terrorism will continue without relent. We are now doing the same to Pakistan, causing Islamabad's military regime to adopt detested policies that alienate it more deeply each day from its angry people, a process that will continue until Musharraf is overthrown and the nuclear-armed nation is swept by an anti-U.S. frenzy. Once again, American pundits, blind to the reality of the Muslim world, will wonder how it happened.

Osama bin Laden may well be captured or killed before November. In fact, he predicted his death this year in a martyrdom operation. No matter, as he has said; his work is done. For Sheik Osama has single-handedly galvanized the Muslim world to resistance against the West by creating a rapidly expanding multinational ideological movement that will likely survive his death.

For Pakistanis, whose previous deep affection for America has turned to bitter hatred, each day that Sheik Osama survives is a small triumph. Call it passive resistance, Pakistani style. ■

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U-turn Ahead

Confounding the war bloggers, Novak reports that Bush wants out of Iraq.

By Justin Raimondo

THE WAR PARTY has suffered heavy losses in the past few months, not the least among them an increasing number of defections, many of them on the Right. Tucker Carlson says he's sorry he ever supported the Iraq War. Retiring Rep. Doug Bereuter (R-Neb.) characterizes it as "a dangerous, costly mess" that was a mistake from the word go. Norah Vincent, former senior fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, apologized to the soldiers for supporting the war. Minnesota Gov. Tim Pawlenty, co-chairman of Bush's state campaign, wants to know, "What's the end game here?"

The end game may be closer than the governor thinks because, as Bob Novak reports, the most significant defectors of all may be within the White House, the State Department, and the Department of Defense: "Inside the Bush administration policymaking apparatus, there is strong feeling that U.S. troops must leave Iraq next year. This determination is not predicated on success in implanting Iraqi democracy and internal stability. Rather, the officials are saying: Ready or not, here we go."

The news has the War Party reeling. Over at *National Review*, Jonah Goldberg is baffled, opining that, if true, it would be "disastrous." Blogger Glenn Reynolds, a law professor who has built a second career on the strength of his laptop-bombardiering, doesn't believe it and sniffs at Novak's "shaky sourcing"—although, since he doesn't know

Novak's source, such a charge seems shaky in itself. Andrew Sullivan, an early and vehement supporter of the war, conjures an elaborate conspiracy theory:

The question lingers: why would anyone in the administration want to leak to Robert Novak that Bush is contemplating a quickish exit from Iraq? An obvious thought is that the leak comes from someone diametrically opposed to such a stance. An admission of any plan of that kind would demoralize the president's supporters (and war supporters) and probably prompt a question in the debates or upcoming news conferences. The president might then be forced to dismiss such an idea, boxing himself into the neoconservative position before the election. Tada! You scotch the withdrawal idea by raising it. The beauty of this is that it uses that anti-war curmudgeon, Novak, to bolster the president's resolve.

No need to worry, Sullivan assures us. Novak's column is a ploy to "wake up" Bush to the alleged need for more troops, more resources, and more large-scale brutality.

The only "beauty" in Sullivan's scenario is the way it illustrates the pathetic disorientation of the War Party. In the midst of the horror and devastation wrought by their handiwork, the mental

and verbal gymnastics required to maintain the illusion of their essential rightness would exhaust lesser men. But not the neocons, and Sullivan proves himself equal to the task by boldly inverting what Novak wrote. The deepness of this kind of denial is hard to fathom. What world are these people living in?

Another sort of evasion has also blinded the president's leftist critics to Novak's glad tidings. Joshua Marshall, a writer for *Washington Monthly* and a popular liberal blogger, sourly suggested the Bushies are talking out of both sides of their mouths—"The campaign will leave to individual voters which message suits their needs"—but neglected to inform us which side is telling the truth. In a campaign season of unusual intensity, the rather encouraging news that the administration is coming to see the error of its interventionist ways is lost amid the partisan sniping.

Matthew Yglesias, a writer for *American Prospect*, disdains the Novak story as "Disinformation, aimed at placating Novak and other anti-war conservatives. Anti-war conservatism is, at this point, primarily an elite, inside-the-beltway phenomenon, so the trick is to convince the rank and file out there that all is well with Iraq while quietly reassuring skeptical elites that Bush is on their side so they don't go publicly off the reservation before the election." This argument assumes a rank-and-file conservative Republican base that approaches the Stalinist parties of yesteryear in its docile dogmatism, but even those dittoheads with the thickest craniums can see that Iraq is far from the "model" that was supposed to transform the Middle East by sheer example. Yglesias also ignores the implications of his own argument: if the conservative masses are so leader-oriented and unthinking, then surely they'll accept this U-turn as readily as Communist cadre countenanced the Kremlin's frequent flip-flops.

Syria, facing growing international pressure to end its longtime military presence in Lebanon, has begun redeploying units belonging to its 20,000-man occupation force.

Intelligence sources are reporting that Syria is shifting some of the soldiers in Lebanon back toward its own border as part of a major realignment that will include consolidation of Lebanon-based units. More than 3,000 soldiers dismantled their bases to the south and east of Beirut before retiring into the Bekaa Valley, hoping to lower their profile in the country and quiet the vocal Lebanese Christian, U.S., and French opposition to their military presence by increasing their distance from the capital. The Syrian actions are disturbing to groups that depend on Damascus's patronage to operate freely in Lebanon, particularly Hezbollah and the radical Palestinian groups that have training and support facilities in refugee camps. While the redeployment is considerably short of a withdrawal, it is a sign that the regime in Damascus is worried about possible United States military action against it.



Secretary of State Colin Powell has given Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom assurances that the United States will soften any declaration on Israeli-Palestinian relations that comes out of future Quartet meetings

of the EU, Russia, the UN and the U.S. on the Middle East road map. Shalom privately voiced concern about remarks made by President Bush in his speech before the United Nations on Sept. 21, during which the president called on Israel to impose a freeze on settlement construction in the West Bank and Gaza and for the Israelis to end the "daily humiliation" of the Palestinians. Bush strongly endorsed the road map, which Prime Minister Ariel Sharon effectively declared dead recently, but otherwise backed Sharon's positions and urged Arab states to recognize Israel and stop supporting Palestinian terrorism.



The Transportation Security Administration has asked the 77 commercial airlines flying in the U.S. to hand over all information relating to passengers who flew during the month of June.

The information will be used to test a new passenger pre-screening program called Secure Flight, which is being developed to compare information on passengers against existing watch lists of suspected terrorists. Currently, airlines have access to a database that is supposed to be checked when a reservation is made or a ticket bought, but there have been numerous glitches. An example of how the system can fail was provided by the diversion of a United Airlines London to Washington flight on which former pop singer Cat Stevens was a passenger. Stevens converted to Islam in 1977 and now calls himself Yusuf Islam. He is watch-listed because Israeli intelligence believes that he contributed money to militant Islamic groups, a charge he denies. Despite Islam's inclusion on the list, he was able to board the flight because his name as it appears on his passport did not exactly match the version in the database. His name was discovered during a mid-Atlantic review of the passenger manifest and the flight was diverted to Bangor, Maine, where he was removed and deported.

Philip Giraldi, a former CIA Officer, is a partner in Cannistraro Associates, an international security consultancy.

One has to ask why critics of the war find it so hard to agree with Novak that the rising crisis in Iraq has reached a turning point: “Whether Bush or Kerry is elected, the president or president-elect will have to sit down immediately with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The military will tell the election winner there are insufficient U.S. forces in Iraq to wage effective war. That leaves three realistic options: increase overall U.S. military strength to reinforce Iraq, stay with the present strength to continue the war, or get out.”

The *New York Post* reports Rice’s denial, but there’s no denying the cold logic of Novak’s equation: either the U.S. increases levels of troop strength, funding, and—invariably—casualties, or else we get out. The *status quo* is intolerable: it’s escalation or withdrawal. The administration, according to Novak, will go with the latter: “Well-placed sources in the administration are confident Bush’s decision will be to get out. They believe that is the recommendation of his national security team and would be the recommendation of second-term officials. An informed guess might have

and more political trouble for the president. In a campaign that is playing heavily on voters’ fears, the Pew poll shows 51 percent of Americans fear another war if Bush wins a second term.

The fear of a wider war is based, in part, on the perception that we really have lost control of events in Iraq—or never really won it to begin with. The dogs of war, once unleashed, are no respecters of boundaries, either political or moral: what is now a guerilla insurrection centered in the Sunni triangle could easily become a regional conflagration. As the second spoke in the “axis of evil” seeks a nuclear shield against the U.S., we are a border incident away from taking on Tehran. Syria, too, is a target and has been warned to seal off its border with Iraq, but this amounts to asking Damascus to come into the war—on the American side.

The neocons want “World War IV”—a war against a billion-plus Muslims from Djibouti to Jakarta. But does George W. Bush want it? Novak’s answer is no. The decision, he reports, has already been made, and—aside from his undoubted reportorial skills—there is ample reason

favor in the Bush administration but that the administration was moving to oppose the neoconservative agenda. Chalabi, who had always been the neocons’ Iraqi poster boy, fell from grace quickly and hard: theft was the least of the charges he found himself confronted with as U.S. soldiers searched his palatial estate for evidence of espionage on behalf of Iran. The neocons were stunned: writing in *National Review*, Michael Ledeen bitterly remonstrated with the administration, asking why the U.S. had “massed so much firepower to break into Chalabi’s house ... and the offices of the INC, instead of doing the same to Moqtada.” Maybe that’s because Moqtada wasn’t the one who fed us phony intelligence about nonexistent Iraqi WMD and betrayed U.S. secrets to Iran, ripping us off for millions in the process.

Chalabi’s neocon allies fibbed their way into seizing control of the mighty U.S. war machine and ran it to ground in Iraq—leaving George W. Bush alone amidst the wreckage. Chalabi is lucky he wasn’t at home when the Americans came knocking, because I, for one, would have treated him with all the respect he deserves.

What is striking about the Pentagon spy scandal—in which AIPAC stands accused of being the conduit through which classified information was passed to Israel from moles in high places—is that the investigation has been ongoing for over two years. That it is just now surfacing could be purely coincidental—or it could mean that the administration is taking this opportunity to move against the neocons on another front, now that one of their number—Pentagon analyst Larry Franklin—has been caught red-handed passing classified materials to Israeli officials.

The Franklin affair smashes yet another neoconservative icon. AIPAC is one of the most powerful lobbies in

CHALABI’S NEOCON ALLIES FIBBED THEIR WAY INTO SEIZING CONTROL OF THE MIGHTY U.S. WAR MACHINE AND RAN IT TO GROUND IN IRAQ—LEAVING GEORGE W. BUSH ALONE AMIDST THE WRECKAGE.

Condoleezza Rice as secretary of state, Paul Wolfowitz as defense secretary and Stephen Hadley as national security adviser. According to my sources, all would opt for a withdrawal.”

Sen. John McCain is always calling for “more boots on the ground”—his formula for a winning strategy in the former Yugoslavia—and the neocons would like nothing better, but this means more body bags shipped home

to believe he’s right. Two recent events foreshadowed this U-turn in U.S. policy: the raid on Ahmad Chalabi’s headquarters in Iraq and the investigation into a possible spy nest in the Pentagon that has been linked to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the policy shop overseen by Douglas Feith.

The raid was the first visible evidence that the neocons were not only out of

Washington: the administration would not take them on unless it meant business. It's also a question of timing: Chalabi barely had time to deny the charges before AIPAC was hiring defense lawyers. In context, the AIPAC investigation could be seen as part of a larger policy shift.

Pat Buchanan predicted in these pages that the American empire had reached its zenith at Fallujah, and the continuing stand-off has only confirmed his analysis: "The neoconservative dream was to create a pro-American, free-market democracy in Iraq to serve as a model and catalyst for Arab peoples and convert Iraq into a base camp of American Empire, flanking Iran and Syria. ... That utopian vision has vanished. President Bush has rejoined the realist camp. We are not going deeper in. We are on the way out."

With elections scheduled for January, and the U.S. determined to keep to this schedule, one can easily foresee how Buchanan's scenario would unfold. In an election in which all major parties would compete over who would kick out the Americans the fastest, the results could only lead to Iraq's newly-installed "democratic" government politely but firmly asking us to leave. How could we refuse?

We are good at nation-smashing but lousy at nation-building. That's the lesson the Republican foreign-policy establishment seems to have learned, so far, from the Iraqi misadventure. It is a good and necessary part of the syllabus, but they have a long way to go before they finally discover—or rediscover—the wisdom of the Founders, who counseled against going abroad "in search of monsters to destroy." ■

Justin Raimondo is editorial director of Antiwar.com and author of An Enemy of the State: The Life of Murray N. Rothbard.

PC Pow-Wow

The Mall's new monument to multiculturalism—cowboys not invited

By W. James Antle III

THE SUN GODS were certainly kind to the grand opening of the \$214 million National Museum of the American Indian. The sky was bright blue and the air was warm as thousands gathered on the Mall to celebrate diversity and indigenousness.

On the Metro ride over to the Smithsonian, it was not just the usual morning commute crowd. Subway cars were packed with people clad in traditional Native American attire, some wearing elaborate headdresses that encroached on the newspaper-reading space of their business-suit wearing, slightly uncomfortable looking seat companions. Press reports estimated that 25,000 American Indians from all over the country came to Washington for the event.

The young women behind me were comparing their outfits like teenagers freshly returned from a jaunt to the local shopping center. "We should trade leggings," one said to the girl next to her. "You would look better in mine, because you have a thinner waist."

My first stop was the Procession of the Nations, a lengthy parade of tribes attending the gathering. Essentially, lines of American Indians marched down the street carrying banners and signs while non-Indians stood on either side and clapped politely. Marchers dressed in military uniforms or carrying American flags won particularly enthusiastic applause. "Go, Oklahoma!" one elderly man repeatedly shouted as if he

were at a sporting event, apparently pleased to see a contingent from his home state.

I confess that most of the assembled nations were unfamiliar to me and at least a few of the names I did recognize—such as the National American Indian Chamber of Commerce—probably are not considered bona fide tribes. There were several marching bands on hand playing what were presumably ancient Native American songs along with some John Philip Sousa.

A family made their way through the crowd and ended up standing next to me. They were wearing moccasins and other traditional garb but did not look especially like Indians. Curious, I asked what nation they belonged to. "We're from New Jersey," the father answered cheerfully. A number of other middle-aged white people present were wearing leis, flowered shirts, white shorts, and other clothes more likely to be seen at a Jimmy Buffet concert than any reservation.

The First Americans Festival looked much like any small-town carnival, featuring storytellers, ice cream men, and even a merry-go-round. Walking past a series of tents filled alternately with artifacts and entertainment, one group of twenty-something young people were loudly telling a high-school-aged boy that this would be his first experience with Native American culture. Speaking with what I took to be a Polish accent, he asked a question



about the Cherokee, mispronouncing it so that it rhymed with “karaoke.” His tutors in diversity rather pompously corrected him and clucked with disapproval.

The displays inside the tents were not overtly political, although many of the American Indians milling around wore bright red buttons proclaiming that their people vote. Kerry for President volunteers were in full force, gathering signatures and handing out literature. No Republican campaign had any visible presence, although the size of the Kerry camp was rivaled by a fairly large group handing out cards advertising a website about traveling to London.

American Indians are a proud people who value their traditions and heritage, traits any conservative would admire. But the affair did suffer from the distinct problem of multiculturalism that strips traditions of any specificity and transforms them into a generic celebration of non-Westernness. Marc Fisher, writing in the *Washington Post*, detected the same flaw in the museum itself, suggesting that it “adds to the balkanization of a society that seems ever more ashamed of the unity and purpose that sustained it over two centuries.” The underlying theme implied that the “American” in American Indian referred to the continents more than this distinct American nation.

Nowhere was this more apparent than in the speechifying at the opening ceremony. There was no live address by the president of the United States, only the politely received reading of a brief letter from the White House by a GOP congressman, but there was a speech by Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo, a Quechua Indian. (In case you were wondering, his English is at least as good as President Bush’s.) One speaker loudly welcomed us to someplace called Native America.

Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell (R-Colo.) was introduced on the dais as the first Native American U.S. senator, an Olympic judo athlete, a motorcycle aficionado, and all-around jack-of-all-trades. He proceeded to give a speech invoking the grandfather spirit, talking about what a paradise free of strife and disease America had been before the arrival of the white man, and reciting the usual lines about the American Indian invention of constitutional democracy—most remarkably, all of it delivered in the bland tone of a Midwestern Republican who might just as well have been talking about marginal tax rates.

As the speakers took the stage, Western innovations were all around them. The museum itself resembles a high-tech imitation of a mud hut. There were numerous “Blossom Cafes,” apparently set up by the Navajo Nation, selling lemonade at \$4 for a large and \$3 for a

regular. All through the speeches, families were snapping up pictures of their children with men dressed like warriors. One man walked by in full battle dress, complete with war paint and a spear-like object, toting a venti Starbucks coffee in his free hand. Indian women with feathers in their hair chatted perkily on cell phones.

At the ceremony’s conclusion, I joined the surge of families who had been there all through the afternoon in their trek back to the subway. One young, stylishly dressed couple within earshot was having a conversation about how they enjoyed the festival and how nice it was to see the American Indians get a back “a slice of their land” through the opening of the museum. They didn’t seem to notice as their toddler son was rifling through his mother’s backpack, pulling out napkins and brochures and throwing them all over the ground. ■

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Big Nanny Is Watching

A common belief, at best remotely related to reality, is that we invent technologies and then use them as we think best. Actually a technology once invented often

seems to follow a course of its own, with humanity being only an astonished and occasionally innocent bystander. So with the Internet. It came from nowhere, unasked, unexpected. It has become, say I anyway, perhaps the central fact culturally, technologically, and politically of our time. Now what?

Everyone with a keyboard has noted with horror the possibilities for social control inherent in networked computers. Yes: possibilities. I follow such things in my guise as a writer on technology for the *Washington Times*. The potential is not even slightly exaggerated. Governments of advanced countries could easily watch their entire citizenry to a degree that would have depressed Kim Il Sung. For practical purposes computing power is without limit, storage capacity infinite, the ability to collate, track, and compare phenomenal. And computers are cheap.

I see the cameras going in, always more of them. Networks abound of practically everything, waiting to be linked. Other technologies, perhaps less familiar (RFIDs, GPS) make it potentially easy to track people, automobiles, everything silently, automatically, and unobtrusively. More and more it is being done. It won't stop.

The crucial question: does it matter? The answer, I suggest, will determine the nature of the world roughly forever. (A privilege of being a columnist is that you can make sweeping dramatic statements that won't be disproved in your lifetime. But this one may actually be worth thinking about.)

Has this power of surveillance been used? What civil rights have we actually lost to technology? How many of us are intimidated by, say, knowing that the FBI can silently read our e-mail? That the government, or any private detective, can find appalling amounts of data on any of us?

Here it is important to distinguish between such things as the Patriot Act, a political abuse that could have been passed by Congress in 1930, and the effects of the Internet. The technology could serve a police state politically imposed, but a police state will not grow inevitably from the technology. I think.

It may be some societies just don't do some things. It is perfectly possible to run a police state with primitive technology. Stalin did quite well at it. The United States could have but didn't. Yes, the technological capacity for totalitarian surveillance in the U.S. is high and growing. Where is the totalitarianism? It does not follow that because we can do something stupid or pernicious we will.

Nor, alas, does it follow that we won't. The question is made more difficult because just as the capacity for surveillance has hit a genuinely high level, we have an arguably paranoid-delusional administration that seems to have skipped high-school civics, at least when the Bill of Rights was being covered. Congress is weak, the Supreme Court surreal. Maybe in 30 years, in samizdat, our time will be remembered as the beginning of total control. If so, it will have been the result of deliberate decisions by Congress.

However, the fear of rubber-truncheon dictatorship may miss the point. While the knock in the night is not America's style, bureaucratic intrusiveness is. So is politicization of the law for the benefit of specific groups. We may have more to fear from petty, distant, intellectually challenged bureaucracies than from dictators.

Some time back I wrote about roadside cameras in England that read the license plates of all cars passing on a highway. The idea, said those in charge, was to find stolen cars. Fine. However, they said, the system might also be used to catch people who owed fines or whose insurance had lapsed. This, the creeping use of universal surveillance to harass perpetrators of increasingly trivial offenses, is both likely and odious.

In the United States, I have encountered suggestions that car-tracking devices should be used to tell when particular cars have spent too much time near bars. The driver would then get a form letter suggesting that he might consider alcohol counseling. New Mexico recently defeated a bill that would have made alcohol sensors mandatory in all cars, which wouldn't start if you blew too high. One imagines extensions to red-light districts and so on. Another suggestion was round-the-clock monitoring of the speed of automobiles. Crank it up to 80 at 3 a.m. on a blankly empty interstate and the ticket arrives in the mail.

Opposing this virtuousness will put you in favor of speeding, drunk driving, prostitution, and grand theft auto. That is, the problem of surveillance in America is less likely to be state terror than an ever growing, ever tightening web of nanny-state restrictions, penalties, and admonitions for our own good as determined by remote bureaucracies beyond our influence. Spare me. ■

Arts & Letters

FILM

[*The Motorcycle Diaries*]

Radical on the Road

By Steve Sailer

ACCORDING TO CHE GUEVARA'S father, "In my son's veins flowed the blood of the Irish rebels. Che inherited some of the features of our restless ancestors ... which drew him to distant wandering, dangerous adventures, and new ideas."

A roving spirit led the messianic Argentine revolutionary to Guatemala when the CIA overthrew the leftist government in 1954, to the Congo in a disastrous military foray in 1965, and to Bolivia, betrayal, and martyrdom in 1967. Ironically, Guevara's one concrete accomplishment was, as Fidel Castro's chief executioner, to help found a regime in Cuba that enforced the diktat that those who leave may never return.

Now, when the Bush administration is granting Guevara's famous wish for "two, three, many Vietnams," Che is back. Brazilian director Walter Salles's "The Motorcycle Diaries" is an engaging picaresque recounting Guevara's 1952 journey as a pre-Communist Prince Hal with a Falstaffian friend through Argentina, Chile, and Peru.

Not surprisingly, the plot is, as Homer Simpson would say, just a bunch of stuff that happens. Taking time off from medical school, the introverted, idealistic 23-year-old Guevara and his boisterous, profane pal cross the Andes, fall off their broken-down motorbike a lot, make passes at local girls, exaggerate their medical expertise to bum meals off

impressionable yokels, lend a hand at a leper colony, and eventually have their consciousnesses raised about the oppression of the Andean Indians.

From Hope and Crosby through the Farrelly brothers, Hollywood has generally played this buddy-road-movie genre for laughs, so a film that, while consistently amusing, underscores the freedom and romance of the open road is refreshing. Further, South America has receded over the last generation so far from North American consciousness that Machu Picchu and the rest of the continent's immense, if slightly gloomy, landscapes seem like a revelation once more.

Young Mexican actor Gael Garcia Bernal, a conventionally pretty Latin lover-boy (with an unfortunate resemblance to "Saturday Night Live's" Chris Kattan), sensitively suffers from both the plight of the exploited workers and his terrible asthma. (Guevara was literally an adrenaline junkie: danger released the hormone that allowed him to breathe freely.) Bernal's beautiful Guevara looks like he'll mature nicely into Che's famous T-shirt image as the cotton-polyester Christ of Marxism-Leninism.

Still, Bernal lacks the Irish charm that made the adult Che resemble a hirsute leprechaun in fatigues. Oddly, Bernal's boyhood best friend, the puckish Diego Luna, his costar in "Y Tu Mamá También" (they're the Ben Affleck and Matt Damon of Mexico), is much closer to Guevara in appearance.

The subtitled "Motorcycle Diaries" goes easy on the politics (and ignores Che's obsessive anti-Americanism), barely hinting at why Dr. Guevara would soon abandon healing for killing.

At the end, Che proclaims, "We are a single mestizo race, from Mexico to the Magellan Straits." The Guevaras, however, weren't mestizo at all. They were a

family of decayed aristocrats with leftist pretensions and bohemian manners.

In practice, this mestizo myth paradoxically serves to maintain the white ascendancy. In Mexico, the corrupt ruling party with the contradictory name, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, preached that all Mexicans belong to *la raza*, the "cosmic race" perfectly blending white and Indian. This allowed the PRI, which became more and more dominated by whites as decades passed, to divert attention away from the huge gaps in wealth between whites, mestizos, and Indians. (Mexico's myth of universal *mestizaje* was prudent: in neighboring Guatemala, by contrast, race war flared throughout the 1980s.)

Similarly, the ideology allowed white revolutionaries like Guevara and Abimael Guzman, founder of Peru's Shining Path guerrillas, to justify their leadership of movements built on the brown masses' resentment of the privileges of the conquistadors' heirs. Worse, while straightforward populism could have satisfied the oppressed, the disastrous prestige of Marxism provided white radical intellectuals with an abstruse body of theory with which to intimidate the less educated into being their followers.

Unfortunately, it's an iron law of history that the countries that most need a revolution are the least likely to profit from one. The Cuban Revolution inspired Marxist upsurges in other Latin countries, which led to military crackdowns. When the armies went back to the barracks, free-market democrats took over, but, outside of Chile, largely appear to have failed. This decade's trend is toward anti-white leftist populism, like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela.

But at least white Communists like Guevara are mostly gone. By Latin America's standards, that's progress. ■

Rated R for language.

BOOKS

[*The Affair of the Poisons: Murder, Infanticide and Satanism at the Court of Louis XIV, Anne Somerset, St. Martin's Press, 352 pages*]

Bubble, Bubble Toil & Trouble

By R.J. Stove

A QUICK FREE-ASSOCIATION TEST. Ask a dozen historically literate adults what the name "Louis XIV" means to them. Certainly they will mention Versailles and its architectural splendors. Probably they will refer to Louis's sobriquet "the Sun King" and the literary ornaments of his reign: Molière, Racine, and Corneille above all. Possibly they will recall the reign's leading musical lights (Jean-Baptiste Lully, Marc-Antoine Charpentier, François Couperin), its chief administrators (Cardinal Mazarin, Jean-Baptiste Colbert), and its greatest generals (Marshals Turenne and Vauban, the Prince de Condé). What they will almost certainly not cite is the gravest crisis of Louis's régime: the 1679-82 Affair of the Poisons, which plunged into mephitic gloom the international reputation of France's whole upper class, and which would arguably have swept from power any monarch less determined and adroit than the Sun King himself. This hellish potation of astrology, aphrodisiacs, infanticides, husband-slaying harpies, and wholesale sacrilege is the latest dish served up by British historian Anne Somerset, whose last book (*Unnatural Murder*) dealt with the Overbury assassination that shocked Jacobean London. By a bizarre coincidence, the Affair of the Poisons occurred at the same time as yet another English political scandal: the apogee of Titus Oates, vomiting forth lies after lies about a "Popish Plot."

By 1679, the 41-year-old Louis had reached his own apogee as the most pow-

erful man in continental Europe. *La gloire* was practically coming out of his ears. No other nation retained the strength to threaten him. His army had smacked around the Dutch as they had never been smacked around before. Spain and Portugal had sloughed the status of first-rate powers, Prussia had not yet become one. Austria and Poland were still licking their Thirty Years War wounds. (Anyone who predicted in 1679 that within five years both countries' sovereigns would rescue Christendom by driving the Turks from Vienna's gates would have been considered insane.) Russia's military triumphs under Peter the Great lay far ahead. France's own aristocratic insurgents—who during the *Fronde*, just a generation earlier, had looked as unstoppable as Cromwell's Roundheads across the Channel—had been quelled, not least through enforced Versailles residence. Louis himself possessed an adoring Spanish-born wife (Queen Marie-Thérèse), and an equally adoring chief mistress (Mme. de Montespan), not to mention a steady supply of one-night stands. Therefore he had every excuse to consider himself unassailable. He failed to reckon with the political aftereffects of a sensational homicide trial.

Back in 1676, a diminutive honeypot, the Marquise de Brinvilliers, paid the supreme penalty for multiple murder. Aided by a visage that bespoke childish innocence, Mme. de Brinvilliers had poisoned her father and two brothers, from whom she hoped to inherit. Save for her exalted rank, she could well have been

her execution. Questions inevitably arose: how many other People Like Us were quietly poisoning their own loved ones, and what price the King's own safety? Given that any sudden death—in the prevailing state of medical knowledge—provoked suspicions of foul play, paranoia could fester unchecked.

Enter Nicolas de La Reynie, chief of police (though his functions corresponded more with those of a mayor, since they included flood, fire, and disease prevention quite as much as crime control). La Reynie had proved to be one of those incorruptible, fearsomely disinterested maverick mandarins whom France long excelled in producing, from the late 16th century's Duc de Sully to the mid-20th century's Jean Monnet. In 1667, he slashed the capital's nocturnal mayhem rates by the simple expedient of having 6,500 street lamps installed. Yet nothing in his career prepared him for the discoveries he made once two fortune-tellers, known respectively as La Bosse and La Vigoreux, had been arrested for supplying poisons.

What he found was a kind of parallel universe where poison had become an all-consuming obsession. Fortune-tellers vied with one another to keep their female customers happy, peddling love-philters, cantharides (alias "Spanish Fly"), and arsenic, when not officiating as "angel-makers" (in other words, abortionists). Under torture the defendants implicated rivals, most notoriously a sanctimonious and boozing crone named La Voisin, who performed abor-

HER CRIMES INSPIRED THE *FRISSE* THAT APPEARS INSEPARABLE FROM HIGH-SOCIETY KILLINGS.

forgotten, but her crimes inspired the additional *frisson* that appears inseparable from high-society killings. (For an approximate hypothetical modern equivalent, imagine Paris Hilton wiping out her kinfolk.) Mme. de Brinvilliers's achievements revealed to France's scandalized nobility that People Like Us could be as dangerous as any unwashed peasant, and thousands came to witness

tions as casually as she blew her nose but took unctuous pleasure in having the aborted children baptized. In authentic *Macbeth* style, a typical pharmacopeia of such necromancers would include nail clippings, menstrual blood, and bits of hanged men's corpses, though one entrepreneur favored urine extracted from a dying toad. Hoping to strike extra fear into the malefactors, Louis set up a

Chambre Ardente, so called because it conducted its proceedings in a hall lit by torchlight. La Vigoreux died during interrogation; La Bosse and La Voisin were both burnt at the stake, the latter in her last days abandoning her lubricious pietism and cursing till her final breath.

Nearly every detail of the proceedings went into La Reynie's notebooks, and the longer the Affair lasted the more nightmarish it grew. Its nadir occurred with the arrest of a geriatric priest called Étienne Guibourg, who according to Ms. Somerset bordered on senility, but who mixed his incoherent burlings with all too coherent accounts of offering Black Masses. He "disclosed that after [fortune-teller] La Filastre had given birth to her child, he had celebrated mass on the afterbirth. He was then asked if he had ever performed mass on women's stomachs ... Guibourg then declared that he had first used the stomach of an unknown woman as an altar when he had celebrated a Black Mass at a château ... he did not know the identity of the woman whose body had served as

an altar, but he had understood she was a prostitute enticed off the streets." Other defendants insisted that Guibourg had said such masses again and again (on one occasion allegedly cutting a newborn baby's throat during the ceremony and draining its blood into the chalice), and that the women he used for these obscene rites included none other than Mme. de Montespan.

With this last brain-searing accusation, and the incontrovertible truth that Mme. de Montespan had at least visited La Voisin, Louis's original tough talk about pursuing guilty bluebloods seemed somewhat ill-advised. In fact, none of the leading noble suspects—such as the Comtesse de Soissons (a niece of Mazarin) and Marshal Luxembourg—suffered punishment. The 34 defendants whom the *Chambre Ardente* had condemned to death by the time Louis closed it down in 1682 were all commoners. Mme. de Montespan stayed at court until 1691, exhibiting in her later years (a telling detail) pathological dread of the dark.

La Reynie died in 1709; only weeks afterwards, Louis ordered burnt in his presence all his documents concerning the Affair. He never knew that La Reynie, fearing just such a contingency, kept secret copies of all his own paperwork on the case, copies which found their way to the Bibliothèque Nationale in 1862 (and without which, of course, this book could never have been written). Mme. de Montespan predeceased La Reynie by two years, taking to her grave the secret of whether or not she ever had participated in Guibourg's outrages. Guibourg himself perished in jail in 1686. Louis survived till 1715.

Somerset describes all this—and a great deal else, most of it best omitted from a family magazine like this one—with a cool restraint, which wears much better than the hyperventilating excitement of the sole previous full-length English-language study known to this reviewer (Frances Mossiker's *The Affair of the Poisons*, 1969). She admirably conveys the mood of mischief-making cliques hovering on the borderline between religious ignorance and outright

paganism: with only a tepid faith in God, but willingly genuflecting to the Devil. We read the salutary reminder that 17th-century intellectuals placed an unreasoning trust in alchemy, much as 20th-century intellectuals placed in Marxism. Newton, Boyle, and other scientists believed as credulously in the Philosopher's Stone as did any ignoramus.

What if anything did the *Chambre Ardente's* revelations ensure, other than scaring Louis into comparative sexual continence and facilitating stringent new laws related to poisons' sales? Somerset's assessment displays appropriate caution. Those 34 whom the *Chambre's* verdicts sent to the scaffold could have been disposed of without injurious international publicity via the established courts. As to the factual basis of the *Chambre's* findings concerning occultism, it is too easy nowadays to pooh-pooh them all. Such group hallucinations as the 1980s' demented charges of Satanic ritual abuse in California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and North Carolina—charges cleverly exploited by femocrats like Gloria Steinem—do not inspire confidence in 17th-century investigators' veracity on the same topic. But then along comes some incident like England's "Torso in the Thames" discovery in 2001 (the torso belonged to a small boy fatally mutilated in accordance with a black-magic cult beloved by expatriate Nigerians) to confirm the odious truth: Satanism exists, even if La Steinem says it exists. Thus bringing us back to the proverbial square one.

It does Anne Somerset credit that while parts of the truth concerning the Affair will never be known, she has treated the available evidence as fairly and scrupulously as possible. Be warned, though: after reading her account, you will require days to disinfest your mind. For sheer unrelieved nastiness of subject matter, this book makes *The Devils of Loudun* look like *Carry On Jeeves*. ■

R.J. Stove lives in Melbourne, Australia and is the author of The Unsleeping Eye: Secret Police and Their Victims.

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[Daniel J. Flynn, *Intellectual Morons: How Ideology Makes Smart People Fall for Stupid Ideas*, Crown Forum, 282 pages]

Smart Asses

By Edward Feser

“THERE IS NOTHING so ridiculous but some philosopher has said it.” Things have not improved much in the more than two millennia since Cicero wrote these words. If anything, modern intellectuals—whether philosophers or intellectuals of some other stripe—are even more inclined than were their ancient and medieval forerunners to put forward ideas not only radically at odds with common sense but disastrous in their implementation. Marxism and socialism in general are only the most dramatic examples. Daniel Flynn’s *Intellectual Morons: How Ideology Makes Smart People Fall for Stupid Ideas* surveys several others, associated with the likes of Herbert Marcuse, Alfred Kinsey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and a number of other thinkers who have advanced such causes as environmentalism, feminism, animal rights, and postmodernism.

A serious and sophisticated full-length analysis of why intellectuals are so often attracted to the bizarre and unworkable is long overdue. Unfortunately—and as its rather sophomoric title might lead one to suspect—Flynn’s book is not it. To be sure, the book is better than its moniker suggests, and many of its individual chapters provide clear and useful summaries of the careers and ideas of the thinkers they address. But the analysis of those ideas is sometimes superficial, and Flynn’s treatment of the overall theme of why intellectuals “fall for stupid ideas,” as he puts it, is unsatisfying. In short, the book is something less than the sum of its parts.

At their best, those parts can be arresting. Anyone unfamiliar with recent scholarly research on Kinsey’s life and

work will find in Flynn’s chapter on the famous sex researcher everything he would want to know—and probably more. The story of Kinsey’s rise to national prominence in the late 1940s and early ’50s on the strength of two hefty volumes purporting to document the startling bedroom habits of ordinary Americans and the fraudulence of the methods by which, as we now know, he arrived at his results, are recounted in depth. So too is the extreme depravity of Kinsey’s own sex life, the details of which can put a shudder into even the jaded citizen of AD 2004. (There are, believe it or not, even worse examples than Kinsey’s penchant for inserting toothbrushes into his urethra.)

As Flynn makes clear, to relate such unpleasantness is by no means to resort fallaciously to a crude *ad hominem* attack, as if Kinsey’s work could be sealed off hermetically from his personal predilections. Kinsey’s methods included encouraging his male staff members and their wives regularly to sleep with him and with each other, the point of which was to make them more “open-minded” in their research; amassing an enormous library of pornographic books and films, many of the latter having been made by Kinsey and his staffers themselves; and a massive overreliance on data culled from the testi-

Kinsey’s mind, the illegality of the appalling acts they recounted. There is even reason to believe that pedophilia was on Kinsey’s own long list of favored perversions. Surely this was a scientist whose personal degeneracy thoroughly tainted his work, coloring his assumptions about what was morally and methodologically sound and destroying his capacity for objectivity.

Where, as with Kinsey, there is a close connection between the personal life and intellectual product of one of Flynn’s subjects, his chapters tend to succeed. In the curious case of Rigoberta Menchu, for instance, we have a Nobel laureate whose receipt of the Peace Prize rested entirely on her authorship of an autobiography that has since been exposed as a sham. Purporting to be a simple peasant’s testimony to the brutality of the forces of militarism and capitalism in her native Guatemala, *I, Rigoberta Menchu* was in fact a hoax perpetrated by a Marxist hack who invented tales of oppression and violent death (including, as Flynn notes, some imaginatively grisly death scenes for her brothers, one of whom is in fact still very much alive), apparently suspecting—quite rightly as it turned out—that Western intellectuals would swallow it wholesale without checking the story too carefully for accuracy.

KINSEY’S METHODS INCLUDED ENCOURAGING HIS MALE STAFF MEMBERS AND THEIR WIVES REGULARLY TO SLEEP WITH HIM AND WITH EACH OTHER.

mony of criminal sex offenders, leading to a greatly exaggerated estimate of the amount of deviant sexual behavior existing in American society as a whole.

Kinsey was particularly fascinated with the question of whether and to what extent children, and even infants, are capable of sexual pleasure. He went so far as to consult known pedophiles regularly, who would keep Kinsey apprised of the details of their ongoing crimes, secure in the understanding that the scientific value of their reports trumped, in

Flynn’s chapters on such political activists as Du Bois and Margaret Sanger are also helpful, reminding us as they do of the ugly and disreputable positions such people often took on the great issues of their day, positions their contemporary admirers would like to ignore. NAACP co-founder Du Bois found little good to say about his native United States, but plenty of kind words for Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Russia (both of which he saw, rightly, as exemplars of the socialism to which he was

committed throughout his life), not to mention Imperial Japan and Maoist China. Planned Parenthood founder Sanger endorsed political assassination and other forms of terrorism, and advocated compulsory sterilization, forced segregation, and other eugenic policies as instruments of "racial betterment."

Flynn is less good, however, in dealing with thinkers of greater intellectual heft. With writers like the nearly incomprehensible deconstructionist Jacques

follow from it, and whether the reasons that have led so many to adopt utilitarianism are as compelling as they assume. But Flynn avoids these issues altogether.

Superficial too is Flynn's analysis of the views of novelist Ayn Rand, famous for her uncompromising defense of capitalism. It is all well and good to note, as Flynn does, that Rand's adulterous personal life and the cult-like nature of the movement she founded do not sit well

however, is less a serious intellectual than a vulgar pamphleteer who got lucky. And Sanger was a political activist rather than a thinker, as is the feminist Betty Friedan, to whom Flynn devotes a chapter. There is even a chapter on Alger Hiss, who was neither a thinker nor a political activist, but merely a Harvard-educated State Department official who spied for the Soviet Union. Nor is the work of the genuine intellectuals Flynn writes about of equal merit: Strauss was a serious scholar, and while Chomsky's views on political matters are worthless, his work in philosophy and linguistics is important and deservedly influential; Du Bois, by contrast, stopped doing any serious work very early in his career, and Kinsey's investigations into human sexuality seem to have been a complete fraud.

Flynn's failure to define clearly what makes someone an intellectual in the first place makes it that much more difficult for him to answer to the question of why intellectuals so often advocate bad ideas. He tells us that it has to do with a commitment to ideology and with the psychology of the true believer. But he does not make clear exactly what he means by ideology, an expression that can be used in a variety of ways. If Flynn intends it, as he often seems to, merely as a synonym for bad ideas uncritically held by intellectuals, then telling us, "ideology makes smart people fall for stupid ideas" is not much more than a tautology. The suggestion that ideology is a kind of replacement for religion is more promising, but Flynn does not pursue the idea in depth.

As an attempt to account for the phenomenon that forms the subject matter of the book, then, *Intellectual Morons* disappoints. It may be useful, though, as a primer on the lives and ideas of some of the thinkers and activists who have been, for good or ill (mostly ill), among the most influential in recent intellectual and political history. ■

Edward Feser is the author of On Nozick, a volume in the Wadsworth Philosophers Series.

PLANNED PARENTHOOD FOUNDER SANGER ENDORSED POLITICAL ASSASSINATION AND OTHER FORMS OF TERRORISM, AND ADVOCATED COMPULSORY STERILIZATION, FORCED SEGREGATION, AND OTHER EUGENIC POLICIES AS INSTRUMENTS OF "RACIAL BETTERMENT."

Derrida or the New Left theorist Marcuse, whose defense of his view that tolerance of right-of-center ideas is actually repressive is as obscure as it is Orwellian, Flynn can perhaps be forgiven for not examining their positions in detail. But the ideas of some of the other thinkers Flynn discusses are, even when extreme and offensive, sometimes supported with sophisticated arguments that need to be analyzed more thoroughly. Philosopher Peter Singer is notorious for his defense not only of animal rights and euthanasia but of infanticide as an option for parents of disabled newborns and of bestiality when this can be engaged in without harming the animal. Singer's views are, as Flynn says, utterly reprehensible. But they are also taken by Singer to follow from a consistent application of utilitarianism, which, to oversimplify, holds that what is morally required of us is whatever promotes the maximization of individual preferences or desires. Since this is a moral philosophy advocated by a great many contemporary intellectuals, and not only on the political Left (there are, for example, many libertarians who are committed to some version of it), it is important to consider whether Singer's obscene conclusions really do

with the moralistic rationalism she preached. But her ideas themselves deserve more serious treatment, especially from a conservative writer like Flynn. Then there is Flynn's chapter on Leo Strauss, who famously argued that many of the great writers of the early modern period in intellectual history—thinkers like John Locke and Benedict Spinoza, for example—wrote in a style intended to mask their true intentions. Strauss's methods of interpretation and the conclusions he draws are controversial and sometimes even eccentric, but it is hard to see how they are comparable to the far more extreme and outlandish positions taken by most of the other intellectuals Flynn surveys.

As the examples discussed so far indicate, Flynn's criteria for counting someone as an intellectual moron seem rather unsystematic. Kinsey, Du Bois, Derrida, Marcuse, Singer, Rand, and Strauss certainly fit the usual stereotype of the intellectual as someone who develops a complex system of scientific or philosophical thought and publishes it in one or more lengthy volumes. Other thinkers Flynn treats—for example, the environmental scientist Paul Ehrlich, the linguist Noam Chomsky, and the philosopher Michel Foucault—fit the same pattern. Menchu,

[*Unafraid of Virginia Woolf: The Friends and Enemies of Roy Campbell*, Joseph Pearce, 151 Books, 480 pages]

Red-Baiting Bard

By Thomas Dineen

Exiled like you and severed from
my race
By the cold ocean of my own disdain,
Do I not freeze in such a wintry space,
Do I not travel through a storm as vast
And rise at times, victorious from the main,
To fly the sunrise at my shattered mast?

"Tristan da Cunha," 1926

THE STANZA ABOVE could serve as the epitaph of its author, the controversial South African poet Roy Campbell (1901-57). In an era when such top British writers as W.H. Auden and Stephen Spender either joined the Communist Party or were active fellow travelers, Campbell sided with Franco during the Spanish Civil War, despised the cosseted effiteness of Bloomsbury literati, and found refuge from decadent modernity in Roman Catholicism. This caused him to be exiled from the London literary establishment, a situation aggravated by his acerbic lampooning of left-leaning contemporaries. In this acute and engrossing new biography, Joseph Pearce reveals Campbell to have been not only a brilliant poet, but also a cultural polemicist with an avowedly traditional worldview.

Campbell's childhood in Durban interwove his Scottish Presbyterian ancestry with African surroundings. He "learned Scots ballads from [his] parents and African folklore from the natives." He also loved riding, fishing, and roaming around the veldt. In 1918, he embarked for England, intending to

matriculate at Oxford. He never did, yet his intellectual life blossomed in the university city. Campbell read voraciously and wrote verse imitations of T.S. Eliot and Paul Verlaine, eventually meeting Eliot, the Sitwells, and Wyndham Lewis. Here Pearce vividly captures the post-WWI English literary milieu and scrutinizes claims of earlier biographers about the poet's youth—notably, the unsubstantiated assertion that he went through a homosexual stage.

Campbell left Oxford for London, where he continued to write poetry while taking side trips to the Mediterranean as a ship-hand. He soon met Mary Garman, whom he married in 1922. Their stormy 35-year marriage proved, as Pearce dubs it, "creatively catalytic." Evidence of this appeared in 1924 with Campbell's long creation poem, *The Flaming Terrapin*, which made his name. T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia) wrote of the epic's "glorious imagery and colour." George Russell found Campbell's "savage splendour of epithet" and ability to "marry the wild word so fittingly to the wild thought" unmatched by any young poet.

Returning to South Africa a literary hero, Campbell founded the review *Voorslag* ("Whiplash"), but quarreled with its other editors and sailed back to England in 1926. The tumultuous sojourn bore fruit, however, when he published *Adamastor* (1930), a volume of lyric poetry filled with African imagery. Again, literary London lauded him, as T.S. Eliot praised his "remarkable mastery of meter and language."

While Campbell's fame grew, his marriage nearly fell apart, as Pearce depicts in colorful detail. Befriended by patrician littérateur Harold Nicolson, the Campbells gladly accepted his offer to live rent-free in a cottage near Knole, an estate owned by his wife, the lesbian poetess (and bedmate of Virginia Woolf) Vita Sackville-West. Campbell once called Mary a "mixture of Sappho and Saint Teresa," but had no idea how intensely Vita would bring out Mary's Sapphic side: unknown to him, the women soon became lovers.

To make matters worse, at Knole Campbell had his first disenchanting encounters with the Bloomsbury group. Though they were estimable cultural arbiters, Campbell found their "dilettante dabbling" and "self-gratifying principles ... alien to him." He was also put off by the atmosphere of polymorphous eroticism; he called the estate "something between a psychiatry clinic and a posh brothel."

Mary told Roy about her affair with Vita, which enraged him. He soon left England for Provence, arriving in Martigues an emotionally battered 27-year-old. He wrote Mary pathetic letters imploring her to join him; eventually, she did, most likely because Vita had grown tired of her. Despite his wife's fickleness, Campbell was overjoyed at their reunion and in the next years composed what Pearce considers some of his best verse. In "Wings," the poet finds solace in their love:

When gathering vapours climb in storm
The steep sierras of delight,
Wings of your hair I love to form
And on its perfume soar from sight.
For in those great black plumes unfurled
The darkest condor of my thought
May stretch his aching sinews taut
And fling his shadow on the world.

Campbell thereafter embraced a Hemingwayesque life of bullfighting, fishing, and cavorting with macho Provençal locals. While leftists such as W.H. Auden were striving superficially in the '20s and '30s to express solidarity with *hoi polloi* by donning overalls and eating candy to induce tooth decay, Campbell was actually living the life of a Provençal farmer-fisherman. Pearce revealingly contrasts the poet's authentic working-class experiences with the hypocritical parlor socialism of Bloomsbury and the snobbery of its supporters: "[M]y God how workmen smell," Vita Sackville-West wrote at the time, "How I hate the proletariat."

Some of Campbell's finest poems of this period reflect his nascent attraction

to the Roman Catholicism of Provençal folk, as in "Mass at Dawn" (1929):

Though all was grey beneath the
moon's grey beam,
My boat in her new paint shone
like a bride,
And silver in my basket shone the
bream:
My arms were tired and I was
heavy-eyed,
But when with food and drink, at
morning-light,
The children met me at the water-
side,
Never was wine so red or bread so
white.

After leaving Provence for Spain in 1933, the poet continued to be drawn ineluctably to Catholicism, influenced as much by the local culture as by theology. "We lived for a time on a small farm in the sierras at Altea where the working people were mostly good Catholics, and there was such a fragrance and freshness in their life, in their bravery, in their reverence, that it took hold of us all imperceptibly," he wrote.

Pearce explores this influence insightfully: the poet "thought he had found in Catholicism the antidote to the 'psychic miasma' which he had sought to confront [his] was very much the Church Militant, waging war on the intellectual modernism which he despised." Catholicism offered Campbell a set of ancient values elevated in permanence and sublimity from the materialism, corruption, and triviality of contemporary Europe.

The reaction of the "secularist ascendancy" of Bloomsbury to religious converts was predictably sneering. Virginia Woolf wrote apropos of T.S. Eliot becoming Anglo-Catholic, "[H]e may be called dead to us all from this day forward A corpse would seem to me more credible than he is. I mean, there's something obscene in a living person sitting by the fire and believing in God." (This statement is worth pondering in light of attempts by secularists of today to eradicate religion from all aspects of public life.)

As his faith took root, Campbell displayed a growing political conservatism as well. According to Pearce, "He was alienated by a socialism rooted in the selfish 'snarling' for rights modern states, whether they called themselves fascist, democratic, or Bolshevik, were exerting too much power over the lives of individuals and families." In Spain, Campbell never took up arms for Franco, yet his hatred of communism impelled him to pen Nationalist propaganda during the Spanish Civil War. His anti-Red verse tirade, *Flowering Rifle* (1939), was inferior to his lyric poetry yet effective as propaganda.

While he exulted in the outdoors and mocked the hyper-refinement of the Bloomsbury crowd and other luminaries, Campbell still bemoaned his ostracism by the very writers whose opinions he claimed to despise. Pearce shows that his sense of persecution was, however, sometimes justified. For instance, J.R.R. Tolkien confirmed that Auden and his comrades conspired to get Campbell's works banned. Campbell's satires *The Georgiad* and *Talking Bronco* also sparked vituperative retaliation by left-wing poets, as Stephen Spender derided him as a "coward" and "Fascist." Yet Spender secretly admired his poetry, later admitting being cowed by peer pressure: "[T]he main reason why I never wrote about Campbell during the 1930s was Auden's very critical view of him as a poet."

Pearce includes in his account disturbing snapshots of the Spanish Civil War, especially communist attacks on Catholic clergy. Campbell sheltered several Carmelite friars during the murderous anti-clerical fervor. These monks brought with them the personal papers of St. John of the Cross to save from destruction by the Reds. Campbell's translations of this 16th-century mystic—to many, Spain's greatest lyric poet—became his best-known work. With exquisite tranquility, Campbell traces St. John's (and his own) devotion to Christ in such poems as "Upon a Gloomy Night" (1942):

Lost to myself I stayed,
My face upon my lover having laid
From all endeavours ceasing:
And, all my cares releasing,
Threw them amongst the lilies
there to fade.

These translations outsold all the poet's previous books and caused him, before his untimely death at 55, to be embraced by the establishment once more. "Of all living English poets Roy Campbell is the most masterly in his use of rhyme, and he is able to use metre so as to convey a sense of intense passion," proclaimed the *New Statesman*. Along with his elegant renderings of Baudelaire, the St. John poems remain Campbell's most widely read verse.

Pearce's painstakingly researched biography has a few inaccuracies. Campbell was born in 1901, yet the book jacket reads 1902. There are also a handful of typographical errors and other such minutiae. But these are minor flaws indeed in a trenchant work that includes much new material on Campbell. Pearce also exactly re-evaluates the correct dating of some of the poet's major works, and cites scores of illuminating anecdotes about him from his daughters Anna and Tess. These two offered Pearce many memoirs, letters, and photographs unavailable to previous biographers.

In all, Joseph Pearce has written a definitive biography for those seeking acquaintance with a neglected poet and incisive observer of a turbulent era. Most of all, this superb work should inspire readers to track down and immerse themselves in Roy Campbell's poetry, and make it obscure no longer. ■

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Roth's Counter-History & Mine



I'm not crazy about what-if history. My friend Andrew Roberts, the historian *du jour* in England, having written about Halifax, Palmerston, and

Eminent Churchillians, recently published such an opus featuring poor little me in one of the chapters. It is 1918, and the tsar and his family are smuggled out of Russia thanks to an Allied intervention and settle in neutral Switzerland. The Romanov daughters marry into my family and eschew royal life but become fodder for the world's gossip columnists.

Another friend, the prolific British historian Niall Ferguson, also wrote a what-if opus, and this one worked better. Ferguson is so knowledgeable that he kept his invented history in perspective. In fact, he beat me to it. I had an idea about World War I, but by the time I got around to thinking of starting, his alternative history was out and making waves. My idea was that if Germany had won the 1914 war, it would have been a damn good thing. Let's look at the facts:

Germany under the Kaiser was not the monstrous regime it was made out to be by the propagandists of the British empire at the time the war broke out. Wilhelmine society was philosemitic compared to other European countries; had the highest ratio of well-educated citizens anywhere on earth; was the center of the arts, including music and literature; and was in the forefront of scientific and medical discoveries. Yes, it was a militaristic regime, but so were the other powers of Europe, starting with Britain, France, the Austro-Hungarian empire, and Russia. The reason for the war was Germany's determination to build a fleet rivaling Britain's. The bulldog said no; Fritz said why not? The war broke out because of miscalculations by

everyone involved. No one, starting with the Kaiser, ever imagined that it would end in such slaughter. Home by Christmas was the cry in both camps. And no, Belgian babies were not killed by crushing their brains against trees, there were very few atrocities against unarmed civilians, and both sides behaved well where POWs were concerned. If America had not intervened in 1917, the Germans would have won, however Pyrrhic a victory. Both sides were totally exhausted, but the German army was outside Paris and in better shape than the Allies.

Enter goody-goody Woodrow Wilson, a criminal as far as I'm concerned, and the man who started the rot of overseas intervention and nation-building. Just imagine how hunky-dory it would have been if Uncle Sam had minded his own business and Germany had won. For starters, there would have been no occupation. Germany would have demanded reparations and settled for a larger part in Southwest Africa. There would not have been a Weimar Republic, nor the hyperinflation that radicalized all of Germany towards the extreme Right and Left.

Hitler would have remained an obscure artist and a beer-hall bore. The Jews would have remained loyal German citizens, well off and respected, if not actually loved. No concentration camps. No Holocaust. My cousin the tsar would have been spared and would have become a reigning rather than a ruling monarch. There would have been no Communist takeover, and as a result 60 to 100 million lives and untold suffering would have been spared. Mao would not

have murdered tens of millions, and World War II would have been a figment of Norman Podhoretz's imagination. Still, it's all wishful thinking and nothing to do with history.

Which brings me to Philip Roth and *The Plot Against America* (insightfully reviewed in these pages by Bill Kauffman two issues ago). I know, I know, it's a work of fiction, one that I haven't read and do not plan to read. But from the almost hysterically favorable reviews—one Ron Rosenbaum went giddy, as if the Gestapo had been an American invention and a present reality—it's evident that there are people among us who think that a Nazi America was and is a real possibility. Actually the novel is Roth's scheme to brownnose his Jewish detractors who think he's been satirizing their fears for much too long. One cannot suspend disbelief, as fiction requires, when a hero like Lindbergh is besmirched, no matter what Roth says about not trying to send a message. One cannot suspend disbelief when it was American farm boys who died fighting those who were murdering Jews. One cannot suspend disbelief when FDR, a hypocrite and anti-Semite who never lifted a finger to help anyone except his buddy Uncle Joe, emerges as a hero.

But leave it to fat Frank Rich of the *New York Times* to give the game away. "In truth, we've only just begun to be tested. The war in Iraq has already been pinned on Jewish neo-conservatives by Senator Fritz Hollings and by right-wingers like the unrepentant Pat Buchanan ..." What, pray fat Frank, does Buchanan have to apologize for? We were always against the war, but most Jewish neoconservatives were for it. Roth and Rich should be apologizing to American Jews in general and everyone who has ever served in this country's armed forces in particular. ■

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CONSERVATIVE? BUSH ISN'T EVEN A REPUBLICAN!

Seriously, he isn't. In modern times, Republicans (and, of course, conservatives) have stood for limited, fiscally-responsible, Constitutional government. In 1964, Barry Goldwater emphasized these issues; ditto, the 1964 GOP Platform which denounced LBJ and the Democrats as "Federal extremists" because they were "impulsive in the use of national power" and "improvident in the management of public funds."

In his 1999 book "A Charge To Keep," George W. Bush says he ran for Governor of Texas because "I thought the Federal Government was too big ... I am a fiscal conservative ... Government must be limited and focused." *But, as President, Mr. Bush has given us the most unlimited, fiscally-irresponsible, debt-ridden, unfocused, un-Constitutional government in modern times!*

Mr. Bush's undeclared war in Iraq

is un-Constitutional. And there is no Constitutional authority for: His Department of Education which now costs more than \$60 *billion* annually; his campaign finance "reform" law; his \$540 billion plus Medicare "reform" law to give older people drugs.

On August 28, 2003, explaining why he had signed into law an extension of unemployment insurance, Mr. Bush said: "We have a responsibility that when somebody hurts, government's got to move." In his Convention acceptance speech he said his philosophy is "that government should help people improve their lives."

But, no! The Federal Government is *not* Mr. Bush's personal piggy-bank from which he can take money to "help" people who "hurt." *The job of the President is to obey the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Bush has not done this. Michael Anthony Peroutka, if elected President, would obey the Constitution.*



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
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